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Evidence Update: A Survey of Recent,
Significant Decisions Primarily from the
Federal Courts of the Third and Fourth
Circuits
Hon. Gerald E. Rosen*
I. Introduction
This survey originates from a presentation given to the federal
district and appellate judges of the Third and Fourth Circuits at a
conference sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center. This review focuses
on recent decisions -- primarily from the Third and Fourth Circuit district
and appellate courts -- which raise the type of complicated evidentiary
problems that federal judges frequently encounter in their daily trial and
appellate work. In addition, this evidence update presents important
Supreme Court precedent as well as noteworthy decisions from other
federal circuit courts.
After beginning with significant decisions involving constitutional
issues that have an evidentiary nexus, this article then examines cases
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part II presents concerns
associated with the Fifth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination Clause.
Part III continues with an analysis of some Sixth Amendment cases,
raising issues related to the Confrontation Clause. In Part IV, the focus
shifts to Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence dealing with
presumptions. Part V highlights decisions involving relevancy, character,
and prior bad acts evidence, the discussion of which should be beneficial
because of the reoccurring nature of these and other related questions.
Part VI delves into the concept of privilege; Part VII into the arena of
witnesses. Part VIII continues with issues regarding opinion testimony
and expert witness testimony. Finally, the survey concludes with Part IX
which discusses the hearsay rules and Part X which examines the
miscellaneous rules.
*Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Invested March,
1990. B.A., Kalamazoo College, 1973; J.D., George Washington University, 1979. Adjunct Professor
of Law (Evidence), University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. Judge Rosen would like to express
his deep appreciation and gratitude to Molly Basile Markley (J.D. 1995), David Blau (J.D. 1995),
and Jeffrey Rossman (J.D. 1996) whose hard work, dedication, and talent contributed to both the FJC
presentation and this article.
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II. Fifth Amendment: Self-Incrimination
A. Miranda Violation Claims Are Valid Basis For Habeas Corpus
Petitions: Withrow v. Williams1
In Williams, respondent Robert Allen Williams, Jr. filed a pro se
habeas corpus action contending that inculpatory statements he had made
to police, which the prosecution subsequently used against him at trial,
were taken before the officers had advised him of his Miranda rights.
His efforts to have the statements suppressed previously had been
unsuccessful.2 The state courts denied Williams relief, and he had fully
exhausted all avenues of appeal.3
Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found that Williams had
made his statements during police custodial interrogation conducted
before the issuance of Miranda warnings. The federal courts further found
that the statements which Williams made after the officers had
Mirandized him were involuntary because the officers had promised
Williams lenient treatment if he would tell the truth.4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the state's petition to
consider the narrow issue of whether habeas relief on a Fifth Amendment
exclusion claim is precluded when a petition has been fully and fairly
litigated. Previously, in Stone v. Powell,' the Court held that Fourth
Amendment exclusion issues were precluded from habeas review. The
question the Court faced in Williams, therefore, was whether Stone would
be extended to Fifth Amendment Miranda claims.6
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, declared that Stone was
limited to Fourth Amendment claims only; that is, Fifth Amendment-
based Miranda claims were appropriate issues for habeas review.7
Justice Souter premised his distinction upon the notion that Miranda
rights are personal and fundamental trial rights, which have no external
corroborative guarantees of trustworthiness.8 In contrast, evidence
1. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993), reh'g denied, 113 S. Ct. 3066 (1993), on remand, 2 F.2d 1152
(6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 882 (1994).
2. Id. at 1748-49. The questioning officers decided, after consulting with each other, not
to advise Williams of his Miranda rights. They eventually Mirandized him 40 minutes after
questioning began. Id.
3. Id. at 1749.
4. Id.
5. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
6. Williams, 113 S.Ct: at 1750.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1753. The majority explained that the Stone holding was limited to exclusionary rule
cases because collateral review would do little to advance the rule's interests of deterring behavior
EVIDENCE UPDATE
obtained during a search raising Fourth Amendment issues has
independent probative force and is inherently more reliable. The
Supreme Court also noted that rejecting Miranda claims on habeas review
would not have a significant impact on federal dockets because those
claims could be refiled as due process violations.9
However, the Court ruled that the lower courts had improperly ruled
on the involuntariness of Williams' post-Miranda statements, because
Williams had not raised the issue in his habeas petition.'I Thus, the
Court found that the issue was not properly brought before the Court and
reversed and remanded on this single point."'
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurred in
part and dissented in part, urging that the Stone doctrine be extended to
Miranda violation claims.' 2 Justice O'Connor noted how pre-Miranda
statements made to police are not inherently untrustworthy and how their
exclusion is not constitutionally required, unlike exclusion of thefruits of
an illegal search and seizure.' 3 Justice O'Connor argued that by
extending habeas review to police-custody interrogation claims, the Court
would increase the tension between the state and federal judicial systems
by undercutting judicial finality. 4  Moreover, Justice O'Connor
contended that Miranda was a mere preventative rule and that the true test
for considering a claim of the wrongful use of a confession is whether the
confession was compelled, not whether it was made under the Miranda
warning.' 5 Finally, law enforcement officials could be counted on to
enforce Miranda without the threat of habeas review.'6
Justices Scalia and Thomas also concurred in part and dissented in
part, without reaching the self-incrimination question. Justice Scalia
that violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. The majority thought that applying collateral review in
Miranda situations would preserve the right against self-incrimination and prevent the presentation
of unreliable evidence at trial. Id.
9. Williams, 113 S.Ct. at 1754.
10. Id. at 1755. Williams' only claim on habeas review was that the police officers had
obtained statements from him without satisfying the requirements of Miranda. The district court
found that "without an evidentiary hearing or even argument" these statements were involuntary
under due process rules. Id. Petitioner Pamela Withrow raised objections in the Sixth Circuit and
the U.S. Supreme Court that Williams' pleadings had not notified her of a due process claim.
11. Id. The Court otherwise upheld the granting of the petition.
12. Id. at 1756 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. Williams, 113 S.Ct. at 1758-59.
14. Id. at 1765.
15. Id. at 1761, 1764. Justice O'Connor wrote: "It is entirely possible to extract a compelled
statement despite the most precise and accurate of warnings." Id. at 1764 (citing Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966)).
16. Id. at 1765.
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based his dissent on the ground that Williams had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his claim.' 7
B. Fifth Amendment Violated by Admission of Statements Defendant
Made to Secure Sixth Amendment Rights: United States v. Pavelko8
Pavelko presents an interesting question highlighting the tension
between a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
and his or her Sixth Amendment right to court-appointed counsel. In
Pavelko, defendants Kenney and Pavelko were indicted for bank
robbery.' 9 Pavelko pled guilty and Kenney went to trial.2° To secure
appointed counsel, Kenney filed his CJA affidavit of indigence (showing
no income from any source during the previous year) and answered
questions from the magistrate judge which indicated his indigence.2'
At trial, the government attempted to establish by circumstantial
evidence that Kenney's only possible source of money for certain cash
purchases was the proceeds from the bank robbery.22 To do this, the
government introduced, over Kenney's objection, both his financial
affidavit and his testimony regarding his unemployment and indigence.23
Judge Nygaard, writing the Third Circuit majority opinion, held that
the admission of this evidence was erroneous. Judge Nygaard explained
that the admission of the evidence effectively "conditioned the free
exercise of [the defendant's] constitutional right upon the waiver of the
other," which, if permitted, would require defendants to choose between
their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.24
However, the court found that the error was harmless, because there
was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
different if the evidence of Kenney's indigence had not been admitted.25
17. Williams, 113 S.Ct. at 1766. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. 992 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1993), cerl. denied, 114 S.Ct. 272 (1993).




23. Pavelko, 992 F.2d at 33.
24. Id. at 34.
25. Id. at 35-36.
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C. Although Fifth Amendment Protections Apply for Sentencing
Enhancement Purposes, Defendant's Voluntary Statements Were
Properly Considered for Sentencing Purposes: United States v.
Frierson
26
Frierson, a case of first impression, presented a very interesting and
challenging Fifth Amendment issue concerning sentencing exposure and
enhancement. Frierson pled guilty to bank robbery by intimidation and,
in return, the government agreed to not pursue the related gun charge.27
In an early FBI interview, the defendant voluntarily admitted that he
had used a gun to commit the robbery.28 Although the use of a gun was
not a necessary element of the defendant's bank robbery conviction, the
use of a gun during commission of the offense could enhance his
sentence. 29 Despite the defendant's previous admission, he subsequently
denied using the gun and, at his sentencing hearing, asserted his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination concerning the use of a
gun.3" Regardless, the district judge found that Frierson had used the
gun and, as a result, the judge enhanced his sentence under the pertinent
sentencing guidelines.3 The court also denied a reduction of the
sentence based on the defense's theory of acceptance of responsibility.32
Defendant Frierson then appealed the denial and the imposition of the
enhanced sentence, claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was violated by the use of these admissions against him.33
On appeal, the Third Circuit, with Judge Stapleton writing for the
majority, made two important findings. First, the court found that the
defendant's guilty plea to robbery did not foreclose him from claiming
his Fifth Amendment privilege regarding questions about related conduct
involving the gun.34 The court stated that while the defendant waived
his privilege as to the acts constituting the elements of the crime charged,
he did not waive his privilege with regard to conduct which, although
part of the same episode, was not necessary to the offense or
conviction.35
26. 945 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1515 (1992).
27. Id. at 652.
28. Id. at 653.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Frierson, 945 F.2d at 653.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 655.
34. Id. at 657.
35. Id.
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The court then considered whether the lower court's denial of the
sentencing reduction constituted a "penalty" such that the Fifth
Amendment would apply, or was simply a denial of a benefit to which
the protections of the Fifth Amendment would not apply. The court
noted that a number of circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, have held
that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to decisions involving
sentencing reductions based on the theory of acceptance of
responsibility.36 However, the Third Circuit found that the denial of an
acceptance of responsibility sentencing reduction based upon a
defendant's silence or refusal to admit a non-conviction part of a crime
was, effectively, a penalty, and therefore, the Fifth Amendment privilege
does apply." Thus, the Third Circuit determined that for purposes of
considering both sentencing enhancements and acceptance of
responsibility sentencing reductions, a defendant retains his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and that silence cannot be used against
him either to deny acceptance of responsibility or to enhance his
sentence.3"
Here, however, the court found that the defendant did not assert his
Miranda rights and that the statements that he made acknowledging his
gun use were voluntary.39 Accordingly, the Third Circuit concluded that
the district court had correctly relied upon them for sentencing. For
this reason, the sentence was affirmed.4 '
D. Admission of Defendant's Statements After Agent's Direct Promise
Not To Use a Suspect's Statement is Held Improper: United States v.
Walton
42
In Walton, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in
firearms without a license. 43  His conviction, at least in part, was
procured through the use of a confession that he gave to Alcohol Tobacco
36. Frierson, 945 F.2d at 657 (citing United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir.
1990); United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699, 706-707 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Trujillo,
906 F.2d 1456, 1461 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (11th Cir.
1989)). See also United States v. Clemons, 999 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
704 (1994); United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1028
(1993).
37. Frierson, 945 F.2d at 658-59. See also United States v. Heubel, 864 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 684-86 (3d Cir. 1976).
38. Frierson, 945 F.2d at 659-60.
39. Id. at 661-62.
40. Id. at 662.
41. Id. at 664.
42. 10 F.3d 1024 (3d Cir. 1993).
43. Id. at 1026.
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and Firearms ("ATF") agents who, under the guise of doing a routine
regulatory inspection, were conducting an investigation of illegal gun
trafficking. 44 The ATF agent obtained the confession after the agent
told Walton: "I've known you for a long time. If you want, you can tell
me what happened off the cuff."'45 No one told the defendant about his
Miranda rights on this occasion, although he had been so informed in
connection with a previous "regulatory search."
At trial, the statement was admitted over defendant's Fifth
Amendment-based objection that it was involuntary due to the ATF
agent's promise.46 The Third Circuit reversed, Judge Lewis writing for
the majority, reasoning that the real issue was whether there was a causal
connection between the agent's assurance and the defendant's
statement. 7 More specifically, the question was whether the agent's
statements were so manipulative or coercive that they deprived the
defendant of his ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision
to confess. 48  The court found that the inquiry should focus on the
totality of the circumstances which led to the defendant's statement and
held that the nature of the conversation with the agent and his inducement
of the confession by calling upon their long-standing relationship
constituted circumstances which made the confession involuntary.49
Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the statement. °
E. Admission of Evidence under the Booking Exception Does Not
Violate a Defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights: United States v.
D'Anjou5'
Defendant D'Anjou, a Guyanese national involved in a
predominantly Guyanese drug ring,52 was indicted on drug trafficking
charges." When he was arrested and booked, an INS agent asked
routine background questions concerning D'Anjou's name, address,
citizenship, and place of birth. He gave false answers to all of these
questions. The officers then Mirandized him, and D'Anjou chose to
44. Id. at 1027.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Walton, 10 F.3d at 1029. See United States v. Fraction, 795 F.2d 12, 15 (3d Cir. 1986).
48. Walton, 10 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 605 (3d Cir. 1986).
49. Id. at 1030-32. The court found that it was particularly important that the defendant had
no reason to believe he was the subject of a criminal investigation and that the agents invited him
to speak "off the cuff." Id.
50. Id.
51. 16 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 606-07.
53. Id. at 606.
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invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. 4  At trial, the government
intended to introduce the false answers given by D'Anjou to the INS
agent as evidence of D'Anjou's guilt." D'Anjou moved to suppress the
statements, and the trial court denied his motion. 6
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the INS agent's questioning
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. 7 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, but
found that the Fifth Amendment question presented an issue of first
impression, namely whether routine booking questions constituted police
"interrogation" for Fifth Amendment purposes. 58  Writing for the
majority, Chief Judge Ervin noted that several appellate decisions,
particularly in the Ninth Circuit, have held that where routine questioning
could be anticipated to provide incriminating information, the Fifth
Amendment protections applied.5 ' Here, however, the Fourth Circuit
found that this was not the case. The court asserted that the questioning
did not provide the incriminating element, but rather the defendant's non-
truthful responses.60 Thus, the Fifth Amendment protections were not
applicable here.
III. Sixth Amendment: Confrontation of Witness
A. Exclusion of Evidence That a Victim Had Previously Participated
in an Interracial Fight Did Not Violate a Defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to Confrontation: United States v. Piche6"
In Piche, the defendant was convicted in the district court of eight
counts of conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate Asian-
American men because of their race, color, or national origin.62 In the
incident in question, the defendant and his brother were harassing three
Asian-American men at a bar, ultimately resulting in the death of one of
54. Id. at 608.
55. Id. at 607.
56. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d at 607.
57. Id. at 608.
58. Id. at 608-09.
59. Id. (citing United States v. Henely, 984 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Gonzales-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir.
1986)).
60. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d at 609. The court did indicate that if the police know, or should know,
their questioning during routine booking could lead to incriminating information from the defendant,
the privilege would apply.
61. 981 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2356 (1993).
62. Id. at 706.
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those men.63 During cross-examination of one of the victims at trial, the
defendant sought to admit evidence that the witness had participated in
racial violence on a prior occasion in an attempt to show the victim's bias
resulting from his membership in a gang.' 4 After the district court did
not allow the defense to continue this line of questioning on the prior
incident, the defendant claimed that the limited scope of cross-
examination violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness
testifying against him.65
In analyzing the facts on appeal, Chief Judge Ervin, writing for the
majority of the Fourth Circuit, stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Confrontation Clause are not necessarily coextensive.66 The
court then noted that the trial court is given wide discretion to reasonably
limit cross-examination to avoid problems, such as confusion or
prejudice, without violating Sixth Amendment rights.67 The court found
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-
examination, because the prior fight between the Asian-Americans and
Afro-Americans bore no relation to the defendant, who was a caucasian,
and there was no evidence that the witness was the aggressor.6" The
court also rejected the defendant's argument, since the evidence of the
victim/witness' character was not an essential element of the crime or
defense under Rule 405(b).69  Even if character evidence were
admissible, the court would only allow proof through reputation or
opinion evidence in accordance with Rule 405(a).70
63. Id. at 709-11.
64. Id. at 714.
65. Id. at 714-15.
66. Piche, 981 F.2d at 715.
67. Id. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679. See also United States v. Bodden,
736 F.2d 142, 145 (4th Cir. 1984) (asserting that the right to confrontation is "not so broad as to
deprive the district court of all discretion in limiting needless or confusing inquiry into collateral
matters").
68. Piche, 981 F.2d at 715.
69. Id. at 713.
70. Id. See United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that
testimony of specific activities with the March of Dimes is inadmissible to show good character);
Tyler v. White, 811 F.2d 1204, 1206 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1987) (involving a civil rights action by a
prisoner, where the district court properly disallowed the guard from bringing in "character evidence"
that the prisoner carried brass knuckles and thus was probably the aggressor; the court held that even
if the character evidence was admissible, it would have to be in the form of opinion or reputation
evidence, not specific instances of conduct).
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B. Exclusion of Rebuttal Testimony to Show Government Bias:
United States v. Yearwoocfd
In Yearwood, the defendant was convicted in the district court on
three counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
with actually distributing cocaine.7" On appeal, the defendant contended
that the district court's exclusion of testimony offered by the defense to
rebut the testimony of a government witness violated his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses testifying against him.73
The trial court found that the rebuttal testimony was properly
excluded under Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule
against the use of extrinsic evidence, and held that this type of testimony
would open the door to other collateral matters.7 " The defendant
claimed that the testimony was independently relevant to show the
government witness' bias and cited Delaware v. Arsdall,75 which stated
that "a criminal defendant [may show] a violation of the Confrontation
Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise
appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of
bias on the part of the witness. 76
The Fourth Circuit, per curiam, found that the lower court had not
abused its discretion in not allowing the rebuttal testimony, because the
defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the government's
witness.77 The court noted that the cross-examination of Miller brought
out potential bias and that it was within the discretion of the trial court
to exclude further testimony.78
C. A Defendant is Not Entitled to Cross-Examine a Co-conspirator
About His Sexual Life: United States v. McMillon79
Defendant McMillon was convicted in the district court of conspiring
to distribute and distributing cocaine.8" On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the district court had erred in limiting the defendant's cross-
examination of a government witness, Jacques Beckwith." The defense
71. 2 F.3d. 1150, 1993 WL 311917 (4th Cir. 1993).
72. Yearwood, 1993 WL 311917, at *1.
73. Id. at *4-5.
74. Id. at *5.
75. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
76. Id. at 680.
77. Yearivood, 1993 WL 311917, at *5.
78. Id.
79. 14 F.3d 948 (4th Cir 1994).
80. Id. at 950.
81. Id at 955.
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planned to highlight Beckwith's sexuality in an attempt to impeach his
credibility. 2 More specifically, the defendant had attempted to obtain
testimony at trial that the witness had used drugs to force people, mostly
men, to engage in sexual acts with him, using their addiction to drugs to
coerce them to engage in such conduct.83
The Fourth Circuit, Chief Judge Ervin writing for the majority,
reviewed Rule 611(b) which provides that cross-examination should be
limited to the subject matter of direct examination and to the credibility
of the witness." Further, the court remarked that when credibility of
the witness is at issue, specific instances of a witnesses conduct can be
used in cross-examination if they are probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness.85 The court also noted the competing interests of
protecting the witness from harassment86 and the defendant's right to
cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause. 7 Ultimately, the
court concluded that the trial court had broad discretion to ensure that the
witness was treated fairly and that the cross-examination did not impede
the search for the truth by introducing confusing or prejudicial
material.88 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion
and agreeing with the trial court's decision that this kind of cross-
examination is the kind that harasses and impairs the search for the
truth.89
82. Id. at 956.
83. Id.
84. McMillon, 14 F.3d at 956 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 661(b)).
85. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)).
86. Id. (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931)).
87. Id. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
88. Id. (quoting United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1988)).
89. McMillon, 14 F.3d at 956. In his appeal, the defendant also argued that the admission of
prior bad acts was error. Id. at 954. However, the Fourth Circuit found no reversible error in
applying the Rawle test, see United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1988) and infra Part
V, under Rule 404(b), to the admission of five pieces of testimony. McMillon, 14 F.3d at 955. The
five statements included the following: three statements from co-conspirators who had entered plea
agreements; a police officer's statements that the defendant's wife was flushing things down the toilet
during the execution of a search warrant; and finally, another police officer's testimony regarding the
defendant's financial status during Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Id.
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IV. The Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules.301-302: Presumptions9"
The Effect of the Presumption of Discrimination in a Title VII Suit: St.
Mary's Center v. Hicks9
In this race discrimination case, the plaintiff, Melvin Hicks, alleged
that he was first demoted and then discharged from his job as a
correctional supervisor and officer because of his race. 92 The trial court
found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas test.93 The trial court also determined that the
reasons given by St. Mary's for terminating Hicks were not the real
reasons that led to this termination.94  However, the trial judge
concluded that Hicks nevertheless failed to carry his ultimate burden of
showing that his race was the determining factor in the decision to
demote and discharge him. 95 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed,
holding that once Hicks showed the proffered reasons were pretextual, he
was entitled to judgement as a matter of law. 96 The Supreme Court
majority rejected this reasoning and reversed that decision.97
With a bare five to four majority, the Court decided that the trier-of-
fact's rejection of the employer's asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for its challenged conduct did not automatically entitle the
employee-plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law under McDonnell
Douglas.9" The Court distinguished the burden of production from the
90. FED. R. EVID. 301. PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EVID. 302. APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
In all civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which
is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision
is determined in accordance with State law.
91. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
92. Id. at 2746.
93. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court allocated the burden of production and order for
presentation of proof in Title VII discrimination cases. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
once a plaintiff establishes a primafacie case of racial discrimination, a rebuttable presumption of
unlawful discrimination arises, placing the burden on the employer to produce evidence that there
were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment actions taken.






burden of persuasion, the latter always resting with the plaintiff and not
shifting.99 The Court specifically stated that a plaintiff is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law only if: (1) he proves his prima facie case;
and (2) the defendant fails to produce evidence which, taken as true,
would permit the conclusion that there was a non-discriminatory reason
for the action.00 In particular, the Court held:
The fact finder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by
the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accomplished by
a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements
of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's
proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of
Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such
rejection, "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is
required[.]" But the Court of Appeals' holding that
rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels
judgement for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental
principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the
burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that
the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate
burden of persuasion."1'
V. The Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 401-412: Relevancy and its
Limits
A. Rule 401: Defining Relevant Evidence'0 2
1. Expert Testimony on Types of Asbestos is Admissible, Despite
Lack of Proof as to Which Type Was at Issue: Blancha v. Raymark
Indus.'
0 3
In Blancha, the plaintiff sued Defendant Raymark Industries on
behalf of the estate of Thomas, an individual whose death occurred from
99. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citations omitted). A vigorous dissent was written by Justice Souter, joined by Justices
White, Blackmun, and Stevens.
102. FED. R. EVID. 401. DEFINITIONS OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
103. 972 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1992).
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mesothelioma, a type of cancer. 1°4 While serving as a U.S. Navy
machinist, Thomas had worked for about nine months with asbestos
products made by the defendant." 5  The plaintiff claimed that
Defendant's products had caused the mesothelioma that ultimately led to
Thomas' death.'0 6
At trial, the plaintiff's experts asserted that all types of asbestos
products substantially contribute to mesothelioma 0 7 In rebuttal, the
defendant proffered the expert testimony of Dr. Gee that not all asbestos
products have such an effect, as chrysotile asbestos does not cause
mesothelioma."'0 Defendant presented no evidence, however, that its
own products contained chrysotile asbestos. 9 The jury found in favor
of the defendant,"0 and the trial judge granted a new trial, finding that
the evidence must have misled the jury into concluding that defendant's
product was chrysotile asbestos."'
At the appellate level, Judge Cowen, writing for the majority of the
Third Circuit, held that the expert testimony that the one type of asbestos
(chrysotile) does not cause mesothelioma was relevant even without
evidence regarding what type of asbestos was used in defendant's
products." 2 Therefore, the district court correctly allowed defendant's
expert testimony on causation under Rule 401."' The court explained
that since the plaintiffs expert had testified that all types of asbestos
cause mesothelioma, the defendant was free to challenge that
testimony." 4 In addition, the court asserted that the testimony was not
overly prejudicial." 5
In this case, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that asbestos
was the proximate cause of the decedent's mesothelioma." 6  The
104. Id. at 509. Thomas filed suit in the summer of 1987 upon being diagnosed as having an
asbestos-related condition. Thomas died on August 10, 1988 whereupon, Edward T. Blancha, the
executor of Thomas' estate, was substituted as a plaintiff. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 510. All of the other defendants, with the exception of Keene and Owens-Illinois,
settled or were dismissed prior to trial. Plaintiff actually contends that Thomas' illness and death
were caused by exposure to asbestos products manufactured by Baldwin-Hill, a predecessor business





111. Blancha, 972 F.2d at 510-11.
112. Id. at 514.
113. Id. at 514.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 516. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
116. Blancha, 972 F.2d at 514.
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defendant offered expert testimony that one type of asbestos does not
cause mesothelioma." ' 7 Even though the defendant did not offer any
evidence that its products contained chrysotile asbestos, however, the
expert testimony was not irrelevant under Rule 401."18 Asserting that
the district court would not have been correct in relying upon Rule 403
in excluding Dr. Gee's testimony, the Third Circuit also stated: "Even
if some danger of confusion existed, we do not believe exclusion would
have been justified under Rule 403, because such confusion clearly did
not 'substantially outweigh' the probative value of Dr. Gee's testimony
relating to the proximate cause of the victim's condition."'' 9
Judge Seitz, in dissent, criticized Dr. Gee's testimony that "the
literature" shows that the Navy used chrysotile asbestos on board its
ships. '2 Judge Seitz argued that the trial judge had ignored Rule
7052. when he failed to require the expert to divulge the facts on
which he relied.' In this respect, the trial judge let the jury infer from
an unsupported opinion that the victim was exposed to chrysotile asbestos
on Navy ships.'23
2. The Admission of Evidence That a Defendant Purchased a Gun,
Tape Recordings of Test Firings, a Similar Gun and Ammunition, and
Testimony Regarding the Best Method of Suicide is Relevant Even
Though no Body was Found. United States v. Russell'24
Defendant Russell, a former Marine Captain, was convicted of first
degree murder for the killing of his wife who was also a Captain in the
Marine Corps.'25  On the date of the wife's disappearance, the
defendant and his wife were in the process of a formal separation.' 26
That day, they met at their former married officers' quarters to prepare
it for an inspection.' 27 The wife disappeared, and the defendant was
117. Id. at 513.
118. Id. at 514.
119. Id. at 516.
120. Id. at 518.
121. Fed. R. Evid. 705 provides:
"The expert may testify in terms of opinions or inference and give reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts
or data on cross-examination." (emphasis added.)
122. Blancha, 972 F.2d at 518.
123. Id.
124. 971 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1013 (1993).
125. Id. at 1100.
126. Id. at 1101.
127. Id.
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subsequently charged with his wife's murder despite the fact that the
body was never recovered, there were no witnesses to the crime, and no
murder weapon was ever found.'28 The government's theory was that
the defendant had shot his wife at the utility shed behind the parties'
former residence and then drove to Pennsylvania to dispose of the body
in a mine shaft. 2 9
The defendant claimed that the district court had allowed irrelevant
evidence into the record by admitting the following: (1) evidence that
defendant had purchased a gun; (2) an actual gun similar to the gun
defendant purchased; (3) the type of ammunition used with that gun; and
(4) the results of test firings that were performed at defendant's former
marital residence to gauge how much noise a gun would make.
3
1
Defendant Russell further contended that the admission of testimony
about a conversation regarding the best method of suicide, expert
testimony regarding the splattering of blood, and other testimony dealing
with the defendant's knowledge of the mining regions in Pennsylvania
were also erroneous.' 3 ' The defendant asserted that all of this evidence
was irrelevant, and if relevant, so slight that it should be considered
prejudicial; there was no evidence that his wife was shot, that a gun was
even fired at the residence, or that his gun had any connection with his
wife's disappearance. 32  In addition, the defendant argued that there
was no body or blood spatterings to support the theories on how she was
shot, nor any evidence that her body was transferred to Pennsylvania.'33
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, Judge Luttig writing for the majority,
affirmed the lower court's admission of the evidence as unquestionably
relevant to the government's case that the defendant shot and killed his
wife in the storage shed of their former residence and later disposed of
the body in a mine shaft in Pennsylvania. 34 The court stated that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, since the
evidence tended to prove that the defendant had committed the crime in
the manner set forth by the government. 13  The admission was
improper in that the evidence was relevant under the broad definition in
Rule 401 and that it was within the trial court's discretion to make that
128. Id. at 1100.
129. Russell, 971 F.2d at 1100-01.




134. Russell, 971 F.2d at 1105.
135. Id.
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determination. a6 The court also noted that the evidence was relevant
in light of other evidence undisputed or admitted without objection. 37
B. Rule 403: Determinations Involving Prejudice3'
1. Evidence of Child Molestation, Homosexuality,
and Abuse and Subordination of Women: United
States v. Ham'39
In Ham, the leader and two members of the Hare Krishna
community were convicted of conspiring to violate RICO, committing
mail fraud by selling counterfeit copyrighted paraphernalia, and being
involved in an insurance scheme to lower their rates." The defendants
appealed their convictions, contending that the evidence admitted by the
trial court of homosexuality, child molestation, and abuse and
subordination of women within the community unduly prejudiced the
jury.
4 1
Judge Russell, writing the Fourth Circuit opinion, vacated and
remanded the convictions after deciding that the evidence was highly
prejudicial and should have been excluded.4 2  After reviewing Rule
403, the court stated that the Rule requires that the need for admission be
weighed against the potential harms and that when the harmful
component of relevant evidence becomes unduly prejudicial, a court
should exclude it from consideration by the jury.'43 The court agreed
with the defendant that the implications of child molestation,
homosexuality, and abuse of women unfairly prejudiced the defendant
and emphasized that the implications of child molestation alone would be
prejudicial and inflammatory. "4" The court warned of the danger that
136. Id.
137. Id. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(b).
138. FED. R. EVID. 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE TIME.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
139. 998 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1993).
140. Id. at 1249-50.
141. Id. at 1251.
142. Id. at 1254.
143. Id. at 1252.
144. Ham, 998 F.2d at 1252.
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juries may convict a defendant based on their disdain for him or their
belief that the activities make guilt more likely.'45
After deciding that the evidence was highly prejudicial, the court
weighed the probative value of the evidence against the danger of
prejudice to determine whether its admission was an abuse of the trial
court's discretion. 46 Since the evidence of child molestation and
homosexuality was introduced indirectly to prove motive, the court
determined that the probative value was slight.'47 Introducing highly
inflammatory statements concerning the treatment of women was only
relevant as impeachment evidence, and therefore, the value of admitting
such evidence was lessened even further. 4 ' Although the trial judge
gave limiting and curative instructions regarding the admission of the
evidence,'49 the court of appeals recognized that those instructions are
used when the danger of prejudice is slight and the guilt is overwhelming,
but not in cases like Ham where the prejudice was great and the guilt was
not overwhelming. 5 °
2. Testimony Tending to Show That Alleged Jailbreak Target Was
Discussing Escape: United States v. Aragon5'
In Aragon, the Fourth Circuit, Judge Tilly writing for the majority,
affirmed the conviction of the defendant for conspiring to effect escape,
obstructing justice, violating the Travel Act, 52 and possessing a
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1253.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. The district court stated:
And let me remind you, and I think counsel have, there isn't any defendant on trial
here for sexual acts.... It has all gotten - I don't know whether - whether those things
are permitted, any evidence on it, and whether you accept them or not is entirely up
to you, was only, as I understand the government's theory, to show motive for doing -
allegedly doing certain things. (Joint App. Vol. I-A at 190).
Bear in mind nobody is charged with sexual crimes. The sexual, alleged molestation
is asserted in the indictment, but only in as [sic] an effort to show motive, not anything
else. We are not here to make any moral judgements, we make legal judgements in
courts. (Joint App. Vol. I-A at 194).
150. Ham, 998 F.2d at 1254. See Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Balnd, 908 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a curative instruction could
not obviate prejudice from evidence that the defendant had an outstanding warrant for molestation,
torture, and murder of a young girl); United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 1980).
151. 983 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1993).
152. 18 U.S.A. § 1952(a)(2)(1982)
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controlled substance with intent to distribute. 5 3 The defendant claimed
that the district court erred in permitting testimony that the defendant
discussed jailbreak because it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
5 4
However, the trial court admitted the statement as relevant, since it
tended to prove that- escape was on the defendant's mind.'55 The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the trial court has wide discretion in a
decision not to exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 and will be
reversed only in extraordinary circumstances.' 56 Thereafter, the court
found no abuse of discretion in that the relevance of the testimony
substantially outweighed any undue prejudice.
57
153. Aragon, 983 F.2d at 1308.
154. Id. at 1309.
155. Id. See United States v. Lujan, 936 F.2d 406, 411 (9th Cir. 1991).
156. Aragon, 983 F.2d at 1309-10. See United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 301 n. 2 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985).
157. Aragon, 983 F.2d at 1310.
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C. Rule 404 (a) and (b): Character Evidence and Prior Bad
Acts'58
1. The Admissibility of Evidence of Threats or Intimidation to
Show a Defendant's Consciousness of Guilt: United States v. Gatto5 9
This case involved two members of the Genovese crime family,
Louis Gatto and Alan Grecco, who were charged with various RICO
violations involving illegal gambling. 6° The appeal focused on claims
by the defendants that the district court erred when it admitted certain
testimony of government witness Robert Belli concerning threats and
intimidation of Belli by Grecco, both prior to and during the trial,
including Belli's statement that Grecco had looked at him menacingly
three times during the trial and that a person connected with defendants,
Moe Brown, had attempted to intimidate him in court. 6' The
prosecutor commented at length on this evidence in closing.'62
158. FED. R. EVID. 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT;
EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(A) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of the pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608 and 609.
(b) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request of the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.
For further reading on the subject of character evidence and Rule 404(b), see Joan L. Larsen,
Of Propensity, Prejudice and Plain Meaning: The Accused's Use Of Exculpatory Specific Acts
Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 651 (1993); H. Richard Unriller,
Credence, Character and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776
(1993).
159. 995 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 391 (1993).
160. 1d. at 450.
161. Id. at 451-52.
162. Id. at 452-53.
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Defendants claimed on appeal, among many other things, that this
evidence violated Rules 404(a) and (b) against admission of propensity
evidence through proof of character or similar acts.'63
Judge Stapleton, writing for the Third Circuit, affirmed. 64 The
court found Belli's testimony concerning both Moe Brown and Grecco's
facial gestures to have been properly admitted under Rule 404(b) which
clearly permits such evidence concerning threats or intimidation, whether
inside or outside the courtroom, both as proof of consciousness of
guilt "'65  and to impeach' 66  Belli's helpful testimony to the
defendants. '67
2. Prior Bad Acts Offered Only to Show Propensity: Gov 't of the
V L v. Archibald6 '
Defendant Archibald was charged with the aggravated rape of a ten
year-old girl.'69 The trial court permitted testimony by the girl's
mother that she knew the defendant because he had fathered the child of
her other daughter, the victim's sister.7" The defendant argued that the
evidence of his sexual relations with the victim's sister was not probative
of any material issue in the case other than to show that he had a
propensity to engage in intercourse with underage females.' 7'
The Third Circuit, Judge Cowen writing for the majority, found it
likely that this was evidence tending to show the defendant had a
propensity to engage in intercourse with underage females.' 72 Although
the government argued that the evidence established how the witness, the
163. Id. at 453.
164. Gatto, 995 F.2d at 457.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Marks, 816 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Guerrero, 803 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Gonsalves, 668 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 909 (1982); 22 C. Wrigt & K. Graham, FederalPractice and Procedure Sec. 5240,
at 476 (1978) ("Though it may permit an inference as to the conduct of the party, the basic relevance
of spoliation evidence is to show a consciousness of guilt; as such it is not necessary to make any
inference as to the character of the spoliator to reach the conclusion that his subjective state of mind
is incompatible with the position being asserted in the litigation.").
166. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
971 (1985); United States v. Qamar, 671 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1982); Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d
582 (5th Cir. 1969); C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 5240, at 474
(1978).
167. Gatto, 995 F.2d at 454.
168. 987 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1993).
169. Id. at 182.
170. Id. at 183.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 184-85.
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victim's mother, knew the defendant,'73 the court held that the evidence
was not probative of a material issue other than defendant's character and
found it inadmissible.'74 The court determined that if it were important
to show how the mother knew the defendant, it was not necessary to
inform the jury of the illicit sexual act that had created the
relationship. 7 The Court added that even if the evidence were to have
been admissible under Rule 404(b), it should have been excluded under
Rule 403.76
3. Evidence of Prior Aggravated Rape of Victim's Sister is
Inadmissible: Gov't of the V. L v. Pinney
177
In Pinney, the defendant was convicted of aggravated rape of a
seven year-old girl. 7 1 Under Rule 404(b) the trial court admitted
evidence that the defendant had raped the victim's sister six years earlier
to show: (1) intent and (2) common plan or scheme. 7 9
The Third Circuit, Judge Stapleton writing for the majority, reversed,
finding that the events were too remotely connected to establish either
intent or common scheme.80 In addition, the court asserted that there
was not sufficient detail or uniqueness to establish common plan or
scheme.' Rather, the court found this evidence to be precisely the
type of highly inflammatory propensity evidence that Rule 404(b)
declares to be improper.
8 2
4. Evidence of Prior Convictions Cannot be Introduced into
Evidence Under 404(b) Without Specifying Specific Purposes for Which
Jury May Consider the Evidence: United States v. Sampson s3
Defendant Sampson was convicted of marijuana possession.'84 He
was convicted after the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant's
173. Archibald, 987 F.2d at 185.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 186. Cf United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1005 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating where
only the fact of a prior felony conviction was relevant, the court erred in admitting prejudicial
evidence of the nature of the felony).
176. Archibald, 987 F.2d at 187.
177. 967 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992).
178. Id. at 913.
179. Id. at 915.
180. Id. at 916. See United States v. Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150, 151-52 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637, 639 (4th Cir. 1981).
181. Pinney, 967 F.2d at 916.
182. Id. at 917.
183. 980 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1992).
184. Id. at 885.
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two prior drug convictions; the government had urged that the evidence
should be admitted under virtually each and every one of the
exceptions." 5 However, in admitting the convictions, the trial judge
did not specify the reasons,"' and in giving the jury limiting instruction
about the evidence, the trial judge told the jury that it could only consider
evidence as it related to "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, and not for any
other purpose."'8 7
Judge Nygaard, writing for the majority of the Third Circuit, said
that this was not sufficient, particularly since the government had not
adequately identified the reasons for the admission of the evidence.'
The court stated that the district court "must, in the first instance,
articulate reasons why the evidence also shows something other than
character . . . a mere list of 404(b) purposes is not sufficient." '' 9
Further, the appellate court concluded that the trial court also failed to
engage in a 403 balancing test. 9 ' The court added that unless (1) the
trial court performs this analysis or (2) the rationale is evident from the
record, the appellate court is unable to review the lower court's exercise
of discretion.' 9
5. Evidence of a Prior Bad Act, That Defendant Had a Recipe for
Cooking Crack Cocaine and Had Sold It Before, Offered to Show Intent
is Held Inadmissible: United States v. Hernandez
92
In Hernandez, the defendant was convicted by the district court of
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine. 93  The district court admitted testimony that the defendant
knew a special recipe for cooking crack and had sold it in New York
previously.' 94 The lower court gave a limiting instruction that the jury
could only consider the evidence as bearing on the defendant's intent.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 888-89.
188. Sampson, 980 F.2d at 888.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 889.
191. Id. See Pinney, 967 F.2d at 918. For "Prior Bad Acts," see generally United States v.
Sabatino, 1993 WL 114029 (E.D. Pa. April 13, 1993); Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73 (Del. 1993); and
Cadavid v. United States, 1994 WL 22005 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1994).
192. 975 F.2d 1035 (4th Cir. 1992).
193. Id. at 1036.
194. Id. at 1037.
195. Id. at 1038.
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The Fourth Circuit, Judge Butzner writing for the majority,
reversed.' 96 The court reviewed the four factors that the Supreme Court
had established in Huddleston v. United States'97 to evaluate proposed
404(b) evidence to protect against undue prejudice. More specifically the
court must analyze the following: (1) the evidence must have a proper
purpose under one of the 404(b) exceptions; (2) the evidence must be
relevant under 402; (3) its probative value must outweigh its prejudice
under 403; and (4) the court should give limiting instructions. 9 ' The
Fourth Circuit then noted that a three-step test, the Rawle"9 9 test, had
evolved out of this test. Under the Rawle test, the evidence has to be (1)
relevant to an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3)
reliable.200 The court stated, however, that unlike other circuits, the
trial court is not required to make a specific finding as to the purpose for
which the evidence is admitted. 2 ' Here, the Fourth Circuit found that
the evidence's relevancy to the defendant's intent was tenuous in that it
was remote in time from the events charged in the indictment and that it
had only a slight relationship to the crime charged.20 2
6. Reliability of Evidence That the Witness Had Paid the
Defendant For Agreeing To Assist in Having Road Paved Offered To
Prove Intent and Absence of Mistake: United States v. Bailey
0 3
In Bailey, the defendant, a member of the South Carolina House of
Representatives, was convicted of conspiracy to violate and attempting
to violate the Hobbs Act204 by taking money in exchange for supporting
certain legislation.20 5  The trial court admitted evidence that the
defendant had, in the past, taken a payment from a county representative
in exchange for getting a road paved.206 The defendant attacked the
testimony on all four prongs of the Rawle test, but focused primarily on
196. Id. at 1042.
197. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
198. Hernandez, 975 F.2d at 1038-39 (quoting Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92).
199. United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1988).
200. Id. at 1247; Accord United States v. King, 768 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1982).
201. Hernandez, 875 F.2d at 1039; See also Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1247.
202. Hernandez, 975 F.2d at 1039.
203. 990 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1993).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
205. Bailey, 990 F.2d at 120.
206. Id. at 122.
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the reliability of the testimony in that the witness had a plea bargain with
the government.20 7
The Fourth Circuit, Judge Chapman writing for the majority,
affirmed the admission of the testimony.20 8 In reviewing the evidence
under the Rawle test, the court reasoned that, by claiming that the money
he received was a campaign contribution, the defendant put at issue his
intent and whether there was a mistake made.20 9 For this reason, the
evidence of the earlier payment was relevant to a proper 404(b) purpose
to prove intent or absence of mistake, as well as meeting the "necessary"
prong of the test.2 " Finally, although the defendant claimed the
government's witness had lied about the earlier payment, the court said
that the reliability of the evidence was a question for the jury.21'
7. Other Crimes Evidence That Defendant Was Arrested on State
Charges on the Same Day as Federal Drug Offenses in the Same Area of
the City Tended to Prove Opportunity, Identity, and Absence of Mistake:
United States v. Grooms
21 2
In Grooms, the defendant was convicted of possessing crack cocaine
with intent to distribute.2"3 Defendant Grooms appealed on the ground
that the trial court had erred by not excluding the evidence of his arrest
and conviction in state court and his statements regarding his whereabouts
on the day of the charged offense.2 4  The defendant also claimed that
the limiting instruction given to the jury was insufficient. 25 The Fourth
Circuit, Judge Heaney writing for the majority, found that the district
207. Id. at 122-23.
208. Id. at 124-25.
209. Id. at 124. See generally United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1985) (where
the defendant claimed that "he was present but innocent" during a sale of drugs, and he elicited false
testimony that he had no prior involvement in any cocaine transaction); United States v. Hadaway,
681 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1982) (where the defendant contended he had merely obtained a truck for
friends without knowing it would be used to transport stolen property); United States v. Beahm, 664
F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1981) (where intent was a "key issue" because the defendant was "sharply
contesting the sufficiency of the government's proof of lascivious intent" in a child-molestation case);
United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981) (where
defendant has sought "to depict herself as one whose essential philosophy and habitual conduct in
life is completely at odds with the possession of a state of mind requisite to guilt of the offense
charged....").
210. Bailey, 990 F.2d at 124.
211. Id. at 123. The court noted that 404(b) evidence should only be excluded for lack of
reliability when it would be too "preposterous" for a rational and properly instructed jury to believe.
The credibility of witnesses concerning the prior acts was for the jury. Id.
212. 2 F.3d 85 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1550 (1994).
213. Id. at 86.
214. Id. at 87.
215. Id.
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court had acted within its discretion, acknowledging that although Rule
404(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence of other crimes to prove
character of persons and to show action in conformity therewith, such
evidence is allowed if it would tend to prove, as it did in this case,
opportunity, identity, or absence of mistake.216
8. Evidence Of Prior Speeding Tickets: Sparks v. Gilley Trucking
Co. Inc.
2 17
Sparks sued Gilley Trucking after Sparks ran his Corvette into a
tree, claiming that one of Gilley's logging trucks forced him off of the
road.2"' Gilley offered evidence at trial that Sparks had been racing
with another car, and to support this "racing" defense, Gilley introduced
the six speeding tickets Sparks had received in the past three years.219
The tickets were admitted to show Sparks had "intent, preparation, plan
or motive to race or speed" on the day of the accident.22 Judgement
was entered for Gilley after the jury found both parties were
negligent.221
On appeal, the decision was reversed. The Fourth Circuit found the
speeding tickets to be inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b),
which served only as a basis for the inference that Sparks had behaved
in accordance with his character for speeding on the day of the
accident.222 The speeding tickets could not be admitted to prove intent,
motive, or other state of mind, because none of those elements were
required to be proven in a negligence action."' Rather, the court
concluded that the court must determine whether or not the parties'
actions were those of reasonable persons under similar
circumstances.224
216. Id.
217. 992 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1993).








9. Admission of Other Crimes When Defense Is That Defendant
Did Not Do Act: United States v. Jenkins225
In Jenkins, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the conviction
of the defendant on two counts of distributing LSD.226 The trial court
had admitted rebuttal testimony concerning a prior sale of marijuana by
the defendant as relevant on the issues of knowledge and intent after the
defendant had denied the crimes charged.227 Defendant Jenkins claimed
that admission of the prior bad act was improper, as the issue of intent
did not exist; the defendant denied participation in the alleged crime.228
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the split among the circuits on whether
there is an issue of intent where the defendant claims he did not do the
charged act. The court explained now the Second and Ninth Circuits
have held that there is no issue of intent where the defendant denies
participation in the crime charged,229 while the Seventh Circuit, to the
contrary, has held that the denial negates intent and puts intent at issue
on rebuttal. 20  Next, the court reviewed how the Fourth Circuit
followed a modified approach in United States v. Hernandez3 that
other crimes evidence is not automatically inadmissible to prove intent,
but that the court should look at the relevancy, reliability, and necessity
of the testimony in each case. 2  The court noted that the Eleventh
Circuit stated that a mere denial of participation does not remove the
issue of intent.233
After reviewing those cases, the Eighth Circuit chose to adopt the
approach followed by the Second and Ninth Circuits, finding the evidence
to be inadmissible.2 34  The court reasoned that this rule was in accord
with the plain language of Rule 404, which the courts must interpret as
225. 7 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1993).
226. Id. at 808.
227. Id. at 805-06.
228. Id. at 804.
229. Id. at 806-07. See United States v. Palmer, 990 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 1120 (1994); United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1070 (1989); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 942 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.
1978); and United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1978). But see United States v.
Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the intent language in Powell is
nonbinding dicta and refuses to follow it as such). See also United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748,
753-54 (2d Cir. 1978) and United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1978).
230. United States v. Mazzanti, 888 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
930 (1990).
231. 975 F.2d 1035, 1040 (4th Cir. 1992). See supra, part C.5.
232. Hernandez, 975 F.2d at 1040.
233. United States v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545, 552 (1 lth Cir. 1983).
234. Jenkins, 7 F.3d at 807.
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they would any other statute. The court further stated that the adopted
rule would lead to more consistent results than the decisions using the
Fourth Circuit approach.235
10. Consent Decree Entered in Prior Civil Rights Litigation as
Evidence of Motive or Intent: Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway236
In Johnson, the defendant appealed the admissibility of a consent
order from a prior civil rights action, claiming that its admission was in
violation of Rules 408, 404(b) and 403.237 The Fourth Circuit, Judge
Neimeyer writing for the majority, found that admission of the decree did
not violate Rule 408 in that it was not entered to prove the truth of the
matter.3' The court stated that the past conduct was permitted under
Rule 404(b) to prove issues of motive and intent239 and that any
prejudicial effect was minimized with limiting instructions.240 Since the
trial court has wide discretion in applying Rule 403, the circuit court did
not find an abuse of discretion.24'
D. Rule 405: Methods of Proving Character242
Cross-Examination of a Defendant's Character Witnesses by
Hypothetical Questions Assuming a Defendant's Guilt is Held
Improper: United States v. Mason
43
This case, involving a conviction for distribution of cocaine base,
was reversed and remanded on the ground that the district court allowed
235. Id.
236. 974 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1992).
237. Id. at 1413.
238. Id.
239. Id. See United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
946 (1982) (admitting civil consent decree under Rules 408 and 404(b) to show defendant knew of
SEC reporting requirements).
240. Johnson, 974 F.2d at 1413.
241. Id. See also United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 301 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1105 (1985) ("The trial court has wide discretion [in applying Rule 403] and its
determination will not be overturned except under the most 'extraordinary' of circumstances.").
242. FED. R. EVID 405. METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
(a) REPUTATION OR OPINION. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation
or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination inquiry is allowable
into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. In cases in which character or a trait of
character a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also
be made of specific instances of that person's conduct.
243. 993 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1993).
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improper cross-examination of a defendant's character witnesses.2 44
While attempting to cross-examine the defendant's witnesses about the
defendant's character, the government used hypothetical questions that
assumed the defendant was guilty of the crime charged.245
The Fourth Circuit, Judge Wilkins writing for the majority, found
the hypothetical questions assuming guilt were improper, stating that
although a "guilt assuming hypothetical may be probative of the
credibility of a non-expert witness, an opinion elicited by a question that
assumes defendant is guilty can have only negligible probative value as
it bears on the central issue of guilt. 2 46  The court stated how it had
followed the majority of circuits in condemning the use of guilt-assuming
hypothetical questions with lay character witnesses for expressing an
opinion about, or testifying to, the reputation of the defendant in the
community247 and that the "presumption of innocence" is not served by
this line of questioning.248
244. Id. at 407.
245. Id. at 408.
246. Id. at 409. See United States v. Morgan, 554 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
965 (1977).
247. Mason, 993 F.2d at 409. See United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir. 1990)
(explaining opinion and reputation testimony); United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (8th
Cir. 1989) (explaining reputation testimony); United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (6th
Cir. 1984) (explaining opinion and reputation testimony), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); United
States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d 793,
796-97 (10th Cir. 1981) (explaining reputation testimony); United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez, 547
F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1977). But see United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 274-75 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding that although cross-examination of witnesses who testify solely as to community
reputation with guilt-assuming hypothetical questions may be improper, such cross-examinations are
not erroneous when the witness gives his own opinion).
248. Mason, 993 F.2d at 409. See Oshatz, 912 F.2d at 539.
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E. Rule 407: Subsequent Remedial Measures249
1. Rule 407 Excludes Evidence of Design Change Made Subsequent
to Manufacture But Before Injury: Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co.25
The plaintiff was injured by a forklift and therefore, sued for
defective design in Kelly v. Crown Equipment Company.25" ' At trial, the
plaintiff sought to introduce evidence that after the manufacture of this
particular forklift, but before the accident occurred, the defendant had
altered the design of the forklift. 52  Since Rule 407 excludes evidence
of remedial measures "after an event," the district court excluded this
post-manufacture, pre-accident evidence. The jury returned a no-cause
verdict for the defendant.253
The questions on appeal were: (1) whether Rule 407's exclusion
apply in strict liability cases, including design defect cases; and (2) if
Rule 407 applies in strict liability cases, whether it still applies if it
contradicts with precedential state court decisions. 24 The Third Circuit,
Judge Seitz writing for the majority, answered both of the questions in
the affirmative and affirmed the lower court's decision.
As to the question of strict liability, the court explained that it has
"consistently held that Rule 407 applies to strict liability suits even
though the language in the Rule refers to inadmissibility to prove
negligent or culpable conduct., 25' The court added that Rule 407 has
also been applied "to exclude evidence of pre-accident remedial measures
where the manufacturer is sued under a failure to warn theory.
2 56
249. FED. R. EVID 407. SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made
the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible
to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures,
if controverted, or impeachment.
250. 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992).
251. Id. at 1275.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1275-77.
255. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1275. See also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 733 F.2d 463 (7th
Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 1983);
Hall v. American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d
54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Weiner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080; Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert..
denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
256. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1275. See Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.
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Plaintiffs asserted that Rule 407 was inapplicable to strict liability design
defect cases because case precedent was predicated on failure to warn
theories.257 However, the court declared that Rule 407 also applied to
strict liability claims alleging only a design defect. 58 The court
outlined the two underlying bases supporting Rule 407: first, Rule 407
rejects any suggestion that fault is admitted when subsequent remedial
measures are taken;259 and second, Rule 407 recognizes that public
policy encourages manufacturers to make improvements for greater
safety.260 It concluded that the reasons for refusing to differentiate
between negligence actions and strict liability claims "apply with equal
force to more subtle differences between failure to warn and design
defect theories., 26' That is, a defendant's fear that evidence of remedial
measures may be used against him is the same regardless of the theory
of liability.
With respect to the Erie doctrine question, the court held that the
Federal Rules prevail over state law decisions since the rule is procedural
in nature.262 Here, the court said that the Rule was a relevancy rule
premised upon the presumption that undue prejudice would result to
defendants through jury misuse of the evidence of substantial repairs if
it were admitted. 263  Thus, arguably, this makes the Rule procedural
despite the conflict with state law.264
2. Admission of a Portion of a Report That Constituted Evidence
of Remedial Measures: Allred v. Maersk Line, Ltd.
265
In Allred, the plaintiff was injured while aboard defendant's ship
when his ladder slipped and he fell to the floor.266 On the issue of
liability in a motion for new trial, the district court reviewed the
1987).
257. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1275-76. See Petree, 831 F.3d at 1198.
258. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1276.
259. Id. See Petree, 831 F.2d at 1198.
260. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1276.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1277. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (holding that where a conflict of
law arises in a diversity case, a federal rule of procedure falling within the uncertain area between
substance and procedure must be applied if it is rationally capable as classification as either); Salas
by Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 905 (3d Cir. 1988).
263. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1277. See Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 245-46 (1st Cir.
1985).
264. Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1278 (quoting Salas by Salas, 846 F.3d at 905, citing Hanna, 380 U.S.
at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
265. 826 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Va. 1993).
266. Id. at 967.
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admission of the contradictory testimony of plaintiff Allred, plaintiff
Madden, and a witness and the admission of evidence of remedial
measures: a redacted copy of a Coast Guard reporting form, which
described conditions needed to avoid the ladder sliding on the steel
deck.267
Judge Morgan held that under Rule 407 the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures is not required when offered for another
purpose provided in the Rule.268 Since the evidence here was relevant
to the issue of credibility and its admission was proper for impeachment
purposes under Rule 407, the district court denied the motion for new
trial.269
VI. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Privilege270
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
1. The Common Interest Doctrine: When Insurers Deny Coverage,
The "Common Interest" Doctrine Does Not Apply: NL Indus. Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co.
271
NL Industries sought liability and indemnity coverage from
Defendant Commerial Union, arising from environmental claims it had
paid.272 In response, the defendant asked the plaintiff, NL Industries,
Inc., to reveal the nature of communications between its agents and
counsel within the course of the underlying claims litigation and to turn
over its attorney's work-product. 273  The defendant claimed that these
267. Id. at 969.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 972.
270. FED. R. EVID 501. GENERAL RULE.
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
271. 144 F.R.D. 225 (D.N.J. 1992).
272. Id. at 227.
273. Id. at 228.
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communications were not privileged to the insurers, because they had a
"common interest" with NL Industries.274
Under the "common interest" doctrine, when the same attorney acts
for two parties having a common interest, the communications are
privileged under the attorney-client privilege and may not be disclosed to
a third party, but they are not privileged in a controversy between the
original two parties. 275  However, the "common interest" doctrine is
applicable "only when it has been determined that the defendant insurer
is obligated to defend the underlying action brought against the
insured.''276
In the case at issue, the district court found that allowing insurers to
obtain unrestricted access to attorney-client communications where the
insurers refused to take part in litigation would distort the "common
interest" doctrine. 277  Thus, the court held that there was no common
interest as to the outcome of the coverage action.278 It based this
conclusion upon the adversarial relationship between the plaintiff and
defendants from the time that the defendants denied coverage to the
plaintiff.
279
2. Attorney-Client Privilege Applied to Documents Summoned by
the IRS Relating to a Tax Return: United States v. Bornstein
280
The IRS subpoenaed documents from respondent Bornstein, who was
both an attorney and an accountant.2"' The subpoenaed documents
related to a tax return which Bornstein had prepared for his clients.282
Bornstein refused to turn over the subpoenaed documents, claiming the
attorney-client privilege. 23  The district court upheld the assertion of
274. Id.
275. Id. at 230. See 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2312 (1992). See also United Coal Companies
v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1988); Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins.
Co., 743 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
276. NL Industries, 144 F.R.D. at 231 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins, Co. v. Lafarge Corp., No.
H-90-2390, slip op. at 4 (D.Md. June 9, 1992)). See also Carey-Canada, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 118 F.R.D. 250, 251-52 (D.D.C. 1987) (insurer's duty to defend had been resolved in favor of
coverage prior to discovery dispute).
277. NL Industries, 144 F.R.D. at 231.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 232.
280. 977 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1992).
281. Id. at 113.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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privilege, but did not make a document-by-document in camera
review.
214
On appeal, the IRS claimed this was plain error.2" 5 The Fourth
Circuit adopted a general rule that a document-by-document examination
is preferable; 2 6 however, it also held that in this instance, such an
examination was unnecessary since Bornstein's affidavit described the
documents and the basis for the privilege in sufficient detail.28 7. Thus,
the court held that "when a party asserting the attorney-client privilege
against a tax summons sets out specific facts establishing the elements of
the privilege and detailing the general nature of the withheld documents,
there is no plain error if the district court fails to make a sua sponte,
document-by-document finding. ' '288
3. A Bank May Not Assert the Attorney-Client Privilege Against
Its Shareholders Who Have Shown Good Cause Why They Should Have
Access to the Communications: Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares,
Inc.
28 9
On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court in Sandberg
denied minority shareholders' motion for new trial against defendant
majority bank shareholder. 29' The plaintiffs alleged a breach of
fiduciary duties- in an action challenging a proposed merger.29' On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit, Judge Williams writing for the majority, held
that good cause existed for not allowing the bank to assert the attorney-
client privilege.292
The court noted the importance of the attorney-client privilege, but
stated that the privilege is not absolute.293 Instead, it held that the
privilege is subject to a balancing of the threat of injury by disclosure
against the benefit of assisting the litigation process.294 The court
concluded that even if the meeting was for the purposes of legal advice
and strategy, the bank could not assert its privilege against, the
284. Id.
285. Bornstein, 977 F.2d at 115.
286. Id. at 116.
287. Id. at 116.
288. Id.
289. 979 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1992).
290. Id. at 341.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 354.
293. Id. at 350.
294. Sandberg, 979 F.2d at 350.
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shareholders, because the shareholders were able to show good cause as
to why they should have access to those communications.29
Finally, the court analyzed the conflict that arises when an officer or
director of a corporation seeks to assert a privilege in the best interest of
the corporation against the shareholders for whose benefit the officers or
directors are acting.296  The court noted how this exception to the
attorney-client privilege was originally created to protect fiduciary
relationships.2 97 Regardless, the court held that, in this situation, a
court must balance the corporate manager's need to manage and seek
legal counsel against the interests of the shareholders in disclosure.298
4. The Fiduciary-Beneficiary Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege: Nellis, et. al. v. Air Line Pilots Ass 'n.
29 9
Plaintiff union members sued the national union for breaching
contractual, fiduciary, and fair representation duties, as well as for
interfering with the plaintiffs' prospective employment opportunities.3"'
On a motion to compel production of documents, the plaintiffs sought to
discover certain documents which the defendant had claimed were
protected by the attorney-client privilege."!
First, the magistrate judge held that the fiduciary-beneficiary
exception to the attorney-client privilege applied to this case.30 2  The
magistrate judge added that the communications between the union
295. Id. at 351.
296. Id. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985);
Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 213 S.E.2d 774, 779 (1975) (holding that both the officers and the
directors of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders).
297. Sandberg, 979 F.2d at 352.
298. Id. at 351-52. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430, F.2d 1093, 1101 (5thCir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971) (holding that where the shareholders claim that the officers or directors have
acted inimically to their shareholders' interests, the shareholders may show "good cause" for not
allowing invocation of the attomey-client privilege; the court offers nine non-exclusive factors to
analyze in that determination: (1) the number of shareholders and percentage of stock represented;
(2) the bona fides of the shareholders; (3) the nature of the claim and whether it is colorable; (4) the
necessity or desirability of disclosure, and availability from other sources of information; (5) whether
the action is criminal or of doubtful legality; (6) whether the communications relate to past or
prospective actions; (7) whether the communications are of advise concerning litigation itself; (8)
whether the communications are identified or the shareholders are just fishing; and (9) the risk of
revealing trade secrets or information that is confidential for other reasons).
299. 805 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. Va. 1992), affirmed, 15 F.3d 50 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 56 (1994).
300. Id. at 356-57.
301. Nellis v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 144 F.R.D. 68, 69(E.D. Va. 1992).
302. Id. at 71. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991). See also Garner
v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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officials and the union attorneys concerning legal advice and proceeding
were within the exception,33 but that the communications between a
council of elected pilot representatives and attorneys were not.3"4 The
magistrate judge reasoned that the fiduciary-beneficiary exception
established by the Fifth Circuit was an example of the narrowing of the
privilege." 5 He further explained that in exercising the exception, a
court must weigh the interests of a fiduciary who opposes production of
relevant information by invoking the attorney-client privilege against the
interests of its own beneficiaries.30 6
B. Marital Privilege
1. Confidential Communications Privilege Does Not Apply if
Spouses Were Joint Participants in Criminal Activity: United States v.
HilP
0 7
In Hill, the defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute, possession by a felon of a firearm,
and use of a firearm during, and in relation to, a drug trafficking
offense. 30 ' The court concluded that the defendant's confidential
communications with his wife about his drug activity were not protected
by the "marital communications" privilege, because the wife was a joint
participant in the drug activity.309 The Third Circuit, Judge Scirica
writing for the majority, held that the admissibility of Mrs. Hill's
testimony was governed by her large role in the defendant's criminal
activity." More specifically, her role included accepting deliveries of
drugs, informing the defendant of these deliveries, and counting drug
proceeds. 31 ' The Third Circuit also noted that the spouse need not be
303. Nellis, 144 F.R.D. at 72.
304. Id. at 72.
305. Id. at 70-71.
306. Id. at 70. See Garnder, 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
307. 967 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1992).
308. Id. at 905.
309. Id. at 912. See United States v. Broome, 732 F.2d 363, 365 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 855 (1984). See also United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 936 (1983).
310. Hill, 967 F.2d at 912.
311. Id.
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prosecuted in order to be considered a joint participant." 2
2. Cross-examination of Wife of Accused Regarding Her Prior
Invocation of Marital Privilege Before a Grand Jury: United States v.
Morris
313
Defendant Morris, an attorney, was convicted on various narcotics
charges in the district court.34  The Fourth Circuit, Judge Widener
writing for the majority, vacated and remanded the case,3 5 holding that
the trial court had erred by permitting the prosecution to examine the
defendant's wife, who was testifying as a defense witness, regarding her
prior invocation of the marital privilege." 6 The defendant's wife, who
was also his secretary, asserted the privilege and declined to testify before
a grand jury.317
The court noted the importance placed on the marital privilege by
both Congress 3S and the Supreme Court.319  It then compared the
invocation of the marital privilege to cases which disallowed prosecutorial
questioning about a witness's prior invocation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury.320  By
applying the reasoning set forth in the Fifth Amendment cases, the court
decided that the wife's prior silence before the grand jury created a
danger that the jury would interpret the wife's silence as protecting her
husband and as lying at trial.32 ' After a harmless error analysis, the
court of appeals found that the cross-examination of the wife about her
prior invocation of the marital privilege was reversible error. 22
312. Id. See United States v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408, 412 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
938 (1987) (policies behind the "joint criminal participation" exception to the privilege are concerned
with actual participation, not prosecution).
313. 988 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1993).
314. Id. at 1336.
315. Id. at 1344.
316. Id. at 1341.
317. Id. at 1337.
318. Morris, 988 F.2d at 1341. See Fed. R. Evid. 501.
319. Morris, 988 F.2d at 1341. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980)
(determining that limiting to the witness-wife the right to invoke the privilege in order not to be
compelled to give adverse testimony against her husband furthered "the important public interest in
marital harmony.").
320. Morris, 988 F2d. at 1339.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1340-41.
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3. Use of Statement Allegedly Made by Defendant's Wife During
Cross-Examination of Defendant Violated Marital Communications
Privilege: United States v. Hall323
This care presented the Fourth Circuit with the issue of whether a
statement made by the defendant's wife during the defendant's cross-
examination violated the "marital communications" privilege, even though
the' statement was presented for the purposes of impeachment. In the
case, after the defendant was indicted on various cocaine charges, his
wife provided inculpatory information to the prosecutor that was
damaging to the defendant's case, including her conversations with the
defendant regarding his drug use.324 At trial, the defendant's wife
asserted her privilege not to testify against her husband.3 25 However,
on cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecution read the wife's
incriminating statements under the guise of impeachment.
3 26
Under these facts, the Fourth Circuit held that the use of the
statement violated both the defendant's and his wife's marital
privilege.327 Not only were "marital communications" divulged against
the privilege, but also the court found that the allowance of the wife's
statements in cross-examination nullified the benefit of the wife's
privilege not to testify adversely to her husband.3 2' The court
concluded that, in effect, the prosecution's "artful" cross-examination
allowed it to bring in damaging and otherwise inadmissible testimony
under the marital privilege.3 29 The court also held that the statements
made by the wife were inadmissible hearsay and that they violated the
Confrontation Clause because there was no opportunity for cross-
examination of the wife.330 Accordingly, the court reversed and
remanded.33 '
323. 989 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1993).
324. Id. at 715.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 716.
327. Id. at 716.
328. Hall, 989 F2d at 716.
329. Id. at 716-17.
330. Id. at 717. See Goldsmith v. Witkowski, 981 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1992) (reversing the
conviction on the ground that the prosecution introduced hearsay evidence in violation of the
Confrontation Clause).
331. Hall, 989 F.2d at 718.
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C. Government Privilege
No Presumption of Expectation of Confidentiality With
Informants: United States Dept. of Justice v. Landano332
Landano, an inmate who had been convicted of murdering a police
officer, sought to obtain FBI investigation files through a Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") request. "3  The FBI withheld certain
requested documents under Exemption 7(D)334 which permits law
enforcement authorities to withhold such information if its disclosure
would reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of, or information
provided by, a confidential source.335 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the government sought a blanket presumption that all
sources supplying information to the.government in the course of criminal
investigation are confidential sources within Exemption 7(D).336
The Supreme Court held that the government was not entitled to this
presumption. The Court, Justice O'Connor writing for the majority, said,
"[i]t may be true that many, or even most, individual sources will expect
confidentiality. But the Government offers no explanation, other than
ease of administration, why that expectation should always be
presumed. 3 7  The Court explained, however, that more narrowly
defined circumstances might justify a presumption of expectation of
confidentiality, asserting the following: "A source should be deemed
confidential if the source furnished information with the understanding
that the FBI would not divulge the communication except to the extent
the Bureau thought necessary for law enforcement purposes. "338
D. State Secrets Privilege
Legitimate Danger of Harm to National Security Interests:
United States v. Koreh
339
In this denaturalization proceeding, the United States sought to
revoke the citizenship of the defendant on grounds that, during the
332. 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993).
333. Id. at 2017.
334. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(6).
335. Landano, 113 S.Ct. at 2018.
336. Id. at 2021.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 2020. The Court's rejection of a categorical presumption of confidentiality in
Landano reversed the precedent of many circuits on this issue, although not that of the Third and
Fourth Circuits.
339. 144 F.R.D. 218 (D.NJ. 1992).
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naturalization and immigration process, he concealed his efforts to aid the
Nazis during the World War II era.34' As part of his defense, the
defendant contended that he was the subject of a "disinformation
campaign" waged by Soviet bloc intelligence services against those who
had been employed by Radio Free Europe.34" ' The defendant sought
discovery of documents in the government's possession which might
indicate such a campaign.3 42  The government withheld production of
these documents, contending that they were protected by the "state
secrets" privilege.343
In assessing the government's claim, the district court held that to
invoke the state secrets privilege, "(1) there must be a formal claim of
privilege, (2) lodged by the head of the department which has control
over the matter, (3) after actual personal consideration by that
officer. 34 4 It further stated that the courts must determine whether the
government has met its burden of establishing that the disclosure of the
documents in question would truly jeopardize military or state
secrets.345 It is not necessary for the government to show that harm
would inevitably result from disclosure, but rather that there is a
reasonable danger that harm would result from disclosure.346 The court
noted that when properly asserted, "the privilege is absolute and may not
be pierced by any demonstration of need, no matter how compelling."
347
The court determined that, in the case at bar, the Attorney General
of the United States formally asserted the privilege based upon his
knowledge and personal review of documents and information available
to him.34' The court found that this was sufficient to satisfy the first
prong that "there must be a formal claim of privilege lodged by the head
of the department which has control overthe matter, after actual personal
consideration by that officer. 3 49  Next, the court stated that it was
satisfied that the privilege had been properly asserted. 35" The Attorney
General's assertion and the Assistant Director of the FBI, Intelligence
340. Id. at 220.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 221.
344. Korch, 144 F.R.D. at 221 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)).
345. Id.
346. Id. (quoting Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir.
1984)).
347. Id. See Northrop Corp., 751 F.2d at 399.
348. Id.
349. Korch, 144 F.R.D. at 221 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8).
350. Id.
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Division's supporting declaration both demonstrated that the withheld
material could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national
security by creating a substantial risk that the identity of intelligence
sources might be disclosed.35' After examining the information in
camera, the court held that all of the material did indeed contain
information which posed a substantial risk to United States
intelligence.352  It therefore refused to compel discovery of the
documents. 53
E. Deliberative Process
1. Fact-Opinion Distinction: Inferences Drawn From a Report to
Show Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion Does Not Render the Report
Deliberative: United States v. Real Property"4
In this civil forfeiture case, the government alleged that the
defendant's real and personal properties were forfeitable on the basis that
the properties were used in, and/or facilitated, the conducting or
ownership of an illegal gambling business. 55  The government
petitioned the district court to reconsider its discovery order that had
directed the government to produce a report containing opinions and facts
of a government retained expert who had examined the alleged gambling
machines. 56 The government contended that the report was protected
from pretrial discovery by the deliberative process privilege.357
The district court noted that for the privilege to prevail, the
document must somehow explain, directly or by inference, the reasons
underlying an agency's decision or otherwise expose the process by
which that decision was reached."' Here, the government simply made
the conclusory averment that production of the report would "expose the
deliberative process of the United States Justice Department. 4 359 From
this, the district court inferred that the government feared that disclosure
of the report would expose the fact that the government had exercised its
right of prosecutorial discretion by initiating civil forfeiture proceedings
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 222.
354. 142 F.RID. 431 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
355. Id. at 432.
356. Id. at 432-33.
357. Id. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
358. Real Property, 142 F.R.D. at 434-35.
359. Id. at 435.
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against some of the seized gambling machines and not against others.36 °
The court held, however, that prosecutorial discretion "is not some
closely guarded government secret. '  In addition, it held that the
nonproduction of the report would not shield the fact that the government
had exercised prosecutorial discretion in this action.362
The government's position in this care rested solely on the fact that
the report was utilized during the process of deciding whether to initiate
civil forfeiture actions against certain gambling devices and not against
other gambling devices.3 63  The court noted that the government's
position may be true, but it was not enough to invoke the privilege.364
It held that for the privilege to apply, the document must be a direct part
of the deliberative process in that the document recommends or expresses
opinions on legal or policy matters.365 The court stated that in the
report in question, the expert merely had described the physical
characteristics of the machines and then had rendered an opinion as to
whether the machines were or may have been used as gambling
machines.366 It added that the report failed to shed light on why the
government chose to initiate civil forfeiture actions on certain gambling
devices and not against others, nor did the report expose the process by
which the decisions were reached.3 67  Therefore, the court concluded
that the report was not protected.368
VII. The Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 601-615: Witnesses
A. Rule 603: Witness' Oath or Affirmation369
Ninth Circuit Finds Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Not
Allowing a Defendant/Witness to Use his Customized Oath:
United States v. Ward37
360. Id.
361. Id. See generally Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1005 (1983).





367. Real Property, 142 F.R.D. at 435.
368. Id. See McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
369. FED R. EVID. 603. OATH OR AFFIRMATION.
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the
witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so.
370. 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993). There was a vigorous dissent by Judge Poole and the
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Defendant Ward appealed his convictions for income tax evasion,
arguing that he deserved a new trial, since he was prevented from being
sworn in as a witness by an oath of his own creation. 7' In the version
of the oath that Ward requested to use, Ward replaced the word "truth"
that is in the traditional oath with the phrase "fully integrated
Honesty. 3 72 The trial court rejected Ward's proposed oath.373 Ward
did not testify at trial and presented no witnesses.3 74  Thereafter, he
alleged that the trial court's decision to reject his oath prevented him
from testifying in his own defense.375
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, interpreting the case as a
question of Ward's First Amendment rights.376  In a broadly-drawn
opinion, the court focused its inquiry on the defendant and his
devotions.377 The court concluded that because Ward preferred to risk
conviction and incarceration rather than take an oath which would
"profoundly violate" the beliefs which were "the central theme of all his
published books and writings for the past twenty-two years," he possessed
"the sincerity of true religious conviction.""37
Having established Ward's sincerity, the Ninth Circuit decided that
nothing in Rule 603 prevented Ward from taking an oath in the form that
he requested, so long as he recognized its binding effect on him.379
Further, the court stated that "the principle that the form of the oath must
vitality of this decision outside the Ninth Circuit is questionable. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler,
605 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 107 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1969). See
also Note, A Reconsideration of the Sworn Testimony Requirement Securing Truth in the Twentieth
Century, 75 MiCH L. REv. 1681, 1698, n. 89 (1977).
371. Ward, 989 F.2d at 1016.
372. Id. at 1017. More specifically, the proposed oath read: "Do you affirm to speak with fully
integrated Honesty, only with fully integrated Honesty and nothing but fully integrated Honesty?"
Id.
373. Id. The trial judge, Chief Judge Lloyd D. George of the District of Nebraska, stated:
"'This is an oath that has been around for a very long time. And I'm not going to establish a
precedent where someone can come in and require the court to address that matter differently."'
Ward, 989 F.2d at 1017. These remarks appear to have been made after the plaintiff (proceeding in
proper) approached the bench on the second day of trial with an offer to take both the traditional
and his own oath. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. Ward had filed a "Motion to Challenge the Oath" with the court-on July 9, 1990. Id.
376. Ward, 989 F.2d at 1017.
377. Id. at 1018. Among other questions, the court pondered: "[l]s Ward Sincere? Are his
beliefs held with the strength of traditional religious convictions?" Id. According to the court, "In
order for Ward to invoke 'the protection of the Religion Clauses, [his] claims must be rooted in
religious belief."' Id. at 1017 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
378. Id. at 1018-19. r
379. Ward, 989 F.2d at 1019.
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be crafted in a way that is meaningful to the witness . . . predates our
constitution. " 3go
B. Rule 608: Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness"8'
1. Defendant's Possession and Use of False Identification is
Probative of Defendant's Truthfulness and Credibility as a Witness:
United States v. Williamsa82
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of various counts resulting
from his involvement in a drug distribution conspiracy.3"3  The
defendant appealed the trial court's ruling that the prosecution could, for
impeachment purposes, inquire into an unrelated incident where he had
used false identification to cash stolen checks.384 Defendant Williams
contended that he was unable to take the stand as a result of this
ruling." 5
The district court found (1) that the evidence was offered in good
faith by the government, (2) that it concerned a bad act bearing on the
truthfulness of the accused, and (3) that the government could inquire
380. Id. "FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 603 requires only that a witness 'declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the
witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so."' Id.
381. FED. R. EVID. 608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS
(a) OPINION AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation,
but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than
conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-
incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
382. 986 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3013 (1993).
383. Id. at 87.
384. Id. at 88-89.
385. Id. at 89.
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about the prior incident upon cross-examination of the defendant or any
other witness who testified to his character for truthfulness.8 6
Affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit, Judge Luttig writing
for the majority, held that the evidence of the unrelated incident was
probative of the defendant's truthfulness and credibility as a witness and
thus, could be used to impeach him on cross-examination.387 The
Fourth Circuit emphasized that the trial court only allowed the
prosecution to inquire into the use of false identification and the cashing
of stolen checks, but did not allow evidence of charges or arrest regarding
those activities or impeachment of any witness with extrinsic
evidence.38  If the defendant had testified, the court stated, his
credibility would have been drawn into question and he would have been
subject to cross-examination bearing on truthfulness and credibility under
Rule 608(b).3"9
2. Limiting Impeachment of Plaintiff's Witness by Prior Arrests:
Hafner v. Brown39
In Hafner, the plaintiff filed a Section 1983"9' suit against five
police officers, claiming that the officers deprived him of his
constitutional rights through their use of excessive force and that they
conspired to violate his rights.392  While the defendant officers
contended that the plaintiff was combative and resisted arrest,
39 3
witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the officers had beaten and kicked
the defendant after he was handcuffed.394 At trial, the defendants
attempted to question one of the plaintiffs witnesses about a prior arrest
to show the witness's bias toward the police.3 95 However, the trial
court sustained the plaintiffs objection, stating that only convictions
386. Id. See United States v. Pennix, 313 F.2d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1963). See also United
States v. Zandi, 769 F.2d 229, 236 (4th Cir. 1985).
387. Williams, 986 F.2d at 89.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. 983 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1992).
391. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
392. Hafner, 983 F.2d at 571. The incident arose when the plaintiff was walking the streets
of Baltimore shooting a shotgun. One of the plaintiffs witnesses notified the defendant of the
plaintiff's conduct, and the defendant called for back-up. The other defendant officers arrived on
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should be used -to attack credibility.396 The district court entered a
judgment against four of the officers,397 all of whom then appealed.3 98
One of the grounds for appeal was that the trial court abused its
discretion by disallowing the cross-examination, for impeachment
purposes, of the plaintiff s witness regarding prior arrests, none of which
led to conviction.3 9  Addressing this issue, the court of appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision and held that although prior
convictions and prior bad acts probative of witness's credibility are
allowed under Rules 609 and 608(a), evidence of arrests which
themselves are not probative of a witness's credibility or alleged bias
would not be permitted."'
The court did not find an abuse of discretion in limiting the cross-
examination of the witness, because the defendants had several other
means to impeach the witness, including asking the witness directly about
bias against the police or inquiring into the witness's previous
convictions.4'
B. Rule 609(a): Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of
Crime
40 2
Wilful Failure to File a Tax Return is not a Crime within the
Narrow Ambit of Rule 609(a)(2): Cree v. Hatcher °3
In this medical malpractice case, the district court permitted the
plaintiffs expert witness to be impeached by evidence of his prior
misdemeanor conviction for wilful failure to file a federal income tax
return.4" The district- court concluded that, under Rule 609(a)(2),
396. Hafner, 983 F.2d at 572.
397. Id. at 574.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 576.
400. Id.
401. Hafner, 983 F2d at 576.
402. FED. R. EVID. 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1)
evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the accused; and (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment.
403. 969 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1147 (1992).
404. Id. at 35-36.
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wilful failure to file was a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement.40 5
On appeal, the Third Circuit, Judge Pollak writing for the majority,
disagreed and reversed. The court held that "because the district court
lacks discretion to engage in balancing,406 Rule 609(a)(2) must be
interpreted narrowly to apply only to those crimes that, . . . bear on a
witness' propensity to testify truthfully."4 °7 As interpreted by the Third
Circuit, because neither dishonesty nor a false statement are elements of
the crime of wilful failure to file a tax return, this crime did not
necessarily involve dishonesty or false statements. 4 ' All that needed
to be proven was that the defendant acted "voluntarily and with the
deliberate intent to violate the law."'4 9 Thus, the court concluded that
the proper test for admissibility under Rule 609(a)(2) "does not measure
the severity or reprehensibility of the crime, but rather focuses on the
witness' propensity for falsehood, deceit, or deception."4' 1
VIII. Rules 701-706: Opinions and Expert Witnesses
A. Rule 701: Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses" '
1. In Breach of Contract Suit by Franchisor against Supplier,
Plaintiff-Owner's Lay Opinion Testimony as to the Extent of Damages is
Held Admissible: Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.41 2
In Lightning Lube, Inc., an oil change franchise sued its motor oil
supplier for breach of contract. 413  The sole owner of Lightning Lube,
Inc., Ralph Vermito, was Lightning's primary witness on the issue of
405. Id. at 36-37.
406. Id. at 37. See United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 842 (1983).
407. Cree, 969 F.2d at 37. See United States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
408. Cree, 969 F.2d at 37-38. See United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(requiring that dishonesty or false statements to be an element of the statutory offense).
409. Cree, 969 F.2d at 37 (quoting United States v. Greenlee, 517 F.2d 899, 904 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975)).
410. Cree, 969 F.2d at 38.
411. FED. R. EVID. 701. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination
of a fact in issue.
412. 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993).
413. Id. at 1161.
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damages.414 Although the district court was unwilling to qualify him
as an expert on the quick-lube business, it allowed Vermito to testify
about damages under Rule 701." 1" The jury returned a verdict for
Lightning Lube,4 6 and Witco appealed, arguing that Vermito's lay
testimony failed to satisfy Rule 701's prerequisites for laying a
foundation.4"7
The Third Circuit affirmed the admission of testimony, stating:
[G]iven Venuto's knowledge and participation in the day-to-day
affairs of his business, his partial reliance on the [accountant's] report,
even if prepared by an outsider, does not render his testimony beyond
the scope of Rule 701. As the district court correctly noted, "[i]t is
logical that in preparing a damages report the author may incorporate
documents that were prepared by others, while still possessing the
requisite personal knowledge or foundation to render his lay opinion
admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 701. ' '41s
Witco raised a second contention, claiming that Venuto's damages
testimony about lost profits was improper because it did not help the jury
and was too speculative. 4 9 The Third Circuit disagreed, stating:
It is true that "[a]n opinion based on false assumptions is
unhelpful in aiding the jury in its search for the truth, and
is likely to mislead and confuse," . . . [b]ut ... we have
determined that at least some of Venuto's assumptions
were valid. His testimony was helpful to the jury. Given
this broad discretion of testimony, we therefore cannot
conclude that the district court erred in admitting Venuto's
testimony.420
2. Eyewitness Testimony that Defendant Fired a Gun Accidently
Would Be Helpful to the Jury: Government of the V L v. Knight42'
Judge Cowen, writing for the majority of the Third Circuit in this
case, reviewed the district court's exclusion of eyewitness testimony that
414. Id. at 1174.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 1165.
417. Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1175.
418. Id. (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco, 802 F. Supp. 1180, 1193 (D.N.J. 1992)).
419. Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1175.
420. Id. at 1175-76 (quoting Wilkinson v. Rosenthal & Co., 712 F. Supp. 474, 479 (E.D. Pa.
1989)). See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
421. 989 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 556 (1994).
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the defendant's firing of a gun was accidental.422 The Third Circuit
found that the district court's opinion was erroneous, but harmless.4 23
Thus, the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction.424
If permitted, the witness would have testified that the defendant
neither pointed the gun at the victim nor threatened to shoot him.
425
The Third Circuit held that the witness' opinion that the gunshot was
accidental would have permitted him to relate the facts with greater
clarity and hence would have aided the jury.426 Based on an assessment
of the witness' credibility, the jury then could have attached an
appropriate weight to his lay opinion.427  The panel stated "the
relaxation of the standards of governing the admissibility of [lay] opinion
testimony relies on cross-examination to reveal any weaknesses in the
witness' conclusions .... If circumstances can be presented with greater
clarity by stating an opinion, then that opinion is helpful to the trier of
fact., 42" The panel also observed that allowing witnesses to state their
opinion instead of describing all of their observations had the further
benefit of leaving the witness free to speak in ordinary language.429 In
reliance upon Rule 701, the Third Circuit found that the eyewitness
testimony that defendant fired the gun accidently would have been helpful
to the jury, especially since the witness described the circumstances that
led to his opinion.430 The court concluded that the exclusion of the
eyewitness' testimony was harmless error, however, and that keeping the
evidence out did not prejudice defendant's case.
4 3 1
422. Id. at 629.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 625.
426. Knight, 989 F.2d at 630.
427. Id.
428. Id. See United States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cit. 1982).
429. Knight, 989 F.2d at 630. See Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968).
430. Knight, 989 F.2d at 630.
43 I. Id. See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 337 & n. 19 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 415 (1992).
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3. Testimony by a State Official and Defendants' Former Sales
Representative, Giving Their Opinion Based on Past Experiences with
Defendants, Is Admissible: Winant v. Bostic432
Defendant developers were sued by purchasers of lots for fraud,
breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.433 The
defendants sold lots for an oceanside community with various luxury
amenities, but never received the necessary permits for the project.434
After trial, the plaintiffs were given various damage awards, and the
defendants appealed, contending that the district court had erred in
permitting witnesses to give their opinions about what one of the
defendants knew or intended to do, based on their past experiences with
him.43 One witness, a state official, offered his opinion that the
developer knew, or should have known, that a major development permit
was required.436 The official based this opinion on previous dealings
with the defendant. 437 Another witness, a former sales representative,
testified that, in hindsight, he would agree with the statement that the
defendant never intended to do what he had promised.438
The court of appeals, Judge Niemeyer writing for the majority, held
that the testimony of both witnesses was admissible under Rule 701 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 439 The Court noted that "each testified
to inferences that could have been rationally drawn from the facts of
which the witnesses had personal knowledge., 44' First, the state official
was able to draw rational conclusions based on his prior dealings and
discussions with defendant. Although his knowledge was indirect, the
trustworthiness of his testimony was "akin to that of any circumstantial
evidence from which juries are routinely permitted to draw
inferences.'' 4 ' In addition, the court determined that the other witness,
a sales representative working in constant contact with defendants, was
432. 5 F.3d 767 (4th Cir. 1993).
433. Id.
434. Id. at 770.
435. Id. at 772.
436. Id.






in a position to rationally draw the conclusions that he did in his
testimony.
442
B. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Admissibility of
Expert Testimony" 3
1. In a Landmark Opinion on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony,
the United States Supreme Court Rejects the Frye Test and Formulates
a New Test: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.
44 4
Plaintiffs, two minor children and their parents, sued Merrell Dow
Parmaceuticals to recover for birth defects allegedly resulting from the
mother's use of benedictin, a drug marketed by Merrell Dow for use
against morning sickness.445  Although eight experts testified for the
plaintiffs, Merrell Dow prevailed on a motion for summary judgment
after persuading the trial court that the plaintiffs' scientific evidence
failed to meet the "general acceptance" standard of the Frye rule.446
The Ninth Circ .uit affirmed, also following the Frye test.447  In the
landmark evidentiary decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceutical, Inc., the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded the case, holding that the Frye test was
superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and,
442. Winant, 5 F.3d at 773.
443. FED. R. EVID. 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
444. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
445. Id.
446. Id. at 2791-92. See also Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under
Frye, novel scientific evidence is admissible only if the technique or theory on which it is based has
been "generally accepted" in the relevant scientific community. Id. Here, Plaintiffs' experts'
testimony that Benedictin could cause birth defects was based on animal-cell studies, live-animal
studies, and chemical structure analyses. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791-92. Because there was ample
epidemiological data on Bendectin, the trial court decided that any expert opinion not based on that
data did not have sufficient acceptance in the relevant scientific community to be admissible, and,
thus, the plaintiffs' non-epidemiological evidence was considered worthless. Id. at 2792. Plaintiffs
had also offered testimony based on the recalculation of epidemiological analyses, which, contrary
to the defense expert's opinion, found a causal link between Benedictin and birth defects. Id.
However, the lower court excluded this testimony on the grounds that the analyses had not been
published or subjected to peer review. Id.
447. Id.
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therefore, does not provide the standard for the admission of expert
testimony in the federal courts.44
The Court found that the Frye test was a rigid standard that
conflicted with the permissive tenor of the Rules; neither the language of
Rule 702 nor its drafting history supports the Frye test.449  In
formulating a more liberal approach to the admission of scientific
evidence, the Court noted that initially Rule 702 requires such evidence
to be both reliable and relevant. First, Rule 702's requirement that an
expert's testimony relate to "scientific knowledge" establishes a standard
of reliability; that is, "scientific knowledge" requires an inference or
assumption derived through a scientific method.450 Second, as for
relevancy, Rule 702 mandates that the scientific evidence "assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." '451
The Court stated that the trial court must make a preliminary
determination452 as to whether the evidence at issue satisfies the
foregoing qualifications.453 Accordingly, the Court held that the trial
court, under this scenario, acts as a "gatekeeper" for expert opinion
evidence.
To assist the trial courts in determining whether the theory or
technique meets the standard of reliability and relevance under Rule 702,
the Supreme Court enumerated four general factors which are to be
considered. The first criteria pertains to the "testability" of a particular
theory or technique.454 The Court explained that scientific methodology
is based on "'generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can
be falsified,"' which is the point which distinguishes physical sciences
from other forms of inquiry.455 The second factor of admissibility
examines whether the pertinent theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication.456 While publication does not exactly
correlate with reliability (because new theories and even well-grounded
theories that are of limited interest might not be published), publication
and peer review is nonetheless a component of "good science," because
448. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799.
449. Id. at 2794.
450. Id. at 2795.
451. Id.
452. Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence establishes that the court must determine
preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, subject to the considerations
concerning conditional relevance set forth in Rule 104(b).
453. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
454. Id.
455. Id. (quoting E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
645 (1983)).
456. Id. at 2797.
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"it increases the likelihood that substantial flaws in methodology will be
detected."' 57 Third, trial courts should consider the rate of error in a
given theory or technique.45 Finally, the "general acceptance" of a
theory in the relevant scientific community may be used to determine the
reliability of a scientific method or technique.459 This last factor, one
out of several factors that a trial court may now consider in determining
admissibility, is the legacy of the Fyre test. Although it is only one of
the four factors, it is a potentially influential factor, particularly if an
established theory garners little support or if a new theory has attained
widespread acclaim.46
The Court's interpretation of Rule 702 theoretically should broaden
the admissibility of expert evidence and align this area of evidentiary law
with the flexible policy underlying the Rules. The Court noted that the
focus of the test described in Daubert is "the scientific validity ... of the
principles that underlie a proposed submission."46I The Court also
cautioned that, while this new inquiry under Rule 702 may be flexible,
the admissibility of scientific evidence is still controlled by the limits
imposed by the rest of the Rules, as well as the safeguards present in the
adversary system, such as cross-examination and limiting instructions to
the jury.462
2. Expert Testimony on the Proper Use of Police Dogs and
Slapsticks in Effecting Arrest: Kopf v. Skyrm463
Kopfv. Skyrm involved the use of police dogs in locating suspects
during an arrest. In this case, the Fourth Circuit reversed the exclusion
of the plaintiff's expert testimony regarding the training and behavior of
police dogs.464 In excluding the testimony, the district court decided
"that the standard for excessive force, objective reasonableness, [was]
comprehensible to a lay juror and that expert testimony would therefore
not assist the trier of fact." '465
457. Id.
458. Daubert, 113 S. CL at 2797.
459. Id.
460. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
461. Id.
462. Id. at 2798.
463. 993 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1993), amended, Kopf v. Skyrm, slip op. (4th Cir. July 12, 1993).
464. Id. at 379. The lower court's in limine exclusion of the plaintiffs expert testimony was
an abuse of discretion. Id. The appellate court rejected any sort of blanket rule concerning expert
testimony about the use of force in excessive force cases. Id. at 378.
465. Id.
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According to the Fourth Circuit, expert testimony could have shed
light on the role of police dogs and acceptable practices. Although the
standard is "objective reasonableness," the appellate court determined that
it is not what is objective to the reasonable person, but the reasonable
officer.466 The court held that when this distinction is relevant, it is
"more likely Rule 702's line between common and specialized knowledge
has been crossed.'" 67 The court added: "How to train a poodle to sit
or roll over is not everyday knowledge and could be explained by an
expert. . . . How to train and use a police dog are even more obscure
skills.' 68  The court cautioned that no blanket rule exists on the
admissibility of expert testimony in excessive force cases.469 A case by
case determination as to whether expert testimoney will assist the jury in
answering questions that they may have is necessary.47°
3. Admission of Expert Testimony Irrelevant: Dixon v. CSX, Trans.,
Inc.
47 1
In Dixon, the Fourth Circuit held that expert testimony should be
excluded when the relevancy of test results are significantly outweighed
by the prejudicial effect under Rule 403.472 The expert testimony was
about what other motorists did when they crossed the defendants' railroad
tracks. The court felt that this evidence would prejudice the jury as to
plaintiff's contributory negligence.473
466. Kopf 993 F.2d at 379.
467. Id. at 378.
468. Id. at 379.
469. Id. at 378.
470. Id. at 379.
471. 990 F.2d 1440 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 305 (1993).
472. Id. at 1452 (holding that the testimony of an expert was in error because it was more
prejudicial than probative).
473. Id. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986).
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IX. The Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 801-806: Hearsay
A. Rule 801(d)(2)(A)-(D): Admissions"
1. Alleged Statements of Informant Are Not Admissible as
Statements of Agent of Party-Opponent: Lippay v. Christos475
After a state undercover drug investigation, criminal charges were
filed against Richard Lippay.47 6  At a preliminary hearing, the court
dismissed the charges, because an informant working with the state
narcotics bureau failed to positively identify Lippay as the individual
from whom he had purchased the drugs.477  Subsequently, Lippay
filed a Section 1983 civil rights claim47 against Christos, the state's
undercover narcotics agent.47 9 Over the defendant's objection, the
district court admitted testimony of a drug informant as an admission
against interest made by an agent of a party-opponent. °
In particular, the district court had ruled that Rule 801(d)(2)(D)
applied to the informant "because [he] 'worked with Pennsylvania drug
enforcement agents on a regular basis, was still working with them at the
time he made the statement ... and was compensated for his work."' 48'
Defendant Christos argued that the informant's alleged statement did not
fit within Rule 801(d)(2)(D), because the informer was not Christos'
agent.482
However, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that "an agency
relationship is established only where the party-opponent personally
'directed [the declarant's] work on a continuing basis."'83 The Third
474. FED. R. EVID. 801(D) provides, in pertinent part:
(d) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY. A statement is not hearsay if -
(2) ADMISSION BY PARTY-OPPONENT. The statement is offered against a party
and is ... (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.
475. 996 F.2d 1490 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 305 (1993).
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
479. Id. at 1495. Lippay filed three § 1983 claims. The only one at issue on appeal was a
claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment - unreasonable seizure of Lippay's person. Id.
480. Id.
481. Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1497.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 1498. (quoting Boren v.Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1041 (10th Cir. 1989)) (emphasis in
original).
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Circuit recognized holdings from several courts that statements made by
law enforcement officers are not admissible on an agency theory as
substantive evidence against the sovereign in a criminal prosecution.484
To the court's knowledge, though, the specific issue presented in the
instant case posed a novel question: Whether a government informant's
statements may be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) as vicarious
admissions against a government agent in a civil trial.485
The court concluded that the informant was not Christos' agent for
the purposes of vicarious admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).486
Rather, the court held that the statements of a declarant to a party
opponent who is merely the declarant's co-employee will not be imputed
to that party opponent. To establish an agency relationship, the party
opponent must personally and continuously direct or control the
declarant's daily work performance at the time the declarant makes the
statements.487 In this case, Christos lacked the regular control over the
informant to create the necessary agency relationship. 488 Further, the
court determined that "to the extent [the informant] can be considered to
have worked at the bureau, [he] acted more as Christos' partner than as
his subordinate. 489
The court cautioned that it was not adopting "a per se rule that an
informant can never serve as an agent for a law enforcement officer for
purposes of FRE 801(d)(2)(D)." 49°  In fact, the court recognized that
circumstances may arise when an undercover (or other) officer and an
informant have an agency relationship.49' In the future, the court stated
that it will use a case-by-case analysis to determine whether an officer
has a sufficiently continuous supervisory role to establish an agency
relationship with an informant.492 As one member of the panel opined:
[T]he correct rule is that an out-of-court statement may be admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) when a sufficient supervisory relationship
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1498.
486. Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1498.
487. Id. (citing Boren, 887 F.2d at 1041).
488. Id. at 1499. The court found no evidence that Christos regularly supervised the informant;
in fact, the informant testified that he never considered the agents he worked with to be his superiors.
Id. The court found that this amounted to more of an independent contractor relationship than that
of principal-agent. Id.
489. Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1499. While Christos supervised particular parts of the informant's
work, such as giving him money for drug transactions, this did not amount to functioning as the
informant's superior in terms of the employer-employee relationship under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 1499.
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exists between two individuals who share a unity of interest regarding
the subject matter of the testimony in question . . . even if there is
technically no agency or master-servant relationship between the two
under substantive agency or master-servant law.493
2. Statement of an Employee of a Subsidiary is
Admissible Against a Parent as a Statement of an
Agent: Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc.
4 94
This case involved an antitrust claim alleging a concerted action to
keep the plaintiff automobile dealer from obtaining franchises for
defendant automobile distributor's cars.495 The Third Circuit, in a split
decision, admitted the deposition testimony of the plaintiffs leasing
manager concerning statements made by a representative of the credit
division of the defendant's parent company. 96
The court explained that the district court had erred in finding that
the testimony constituted hearsay, since the representative had the
authority to bind the defendant.4 97  Specifically, the appellate court
asserted that the district court's "conclusion misperceive[d] the nature of
a vicarious admission, which the Federal Rules of Evidence designate as
outside the realm of hearsay by definition."'4 9  In addition, the court
opined that the vicarious admission rule4 99 did not require the declarant
to have the authority to bind the employer; to do so "would preclude
much probative evidence because an employer will rarely authorize its
employees to make incriminating statements. . . . The rule simply
requires that an agent make the statement 'within the scope' of his or her
employment."5 °
The court determined that despite the fact that the declarant had
received his salary from a third party, the declarant was the only
representative for the credit and leasing divisions of the defendant's
parent corporation who was assigned to service the area where the
493. Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1504-05 (Becker, J., concurring).
494. 974 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993).
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 1372.
498. Id. at 1372.
499. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
500. Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1372 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) Advisory
Committee's Note).
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plaintiff sought a dealership."' The court decided that "a statement of
a subsidiary [or employee thereof] may be attributed to its corporate
parent where the parent dominates the activities of the subsidiary."50 2
Here, the court concluded that the defendant's ownership interests, control
through corporate officers, advertising, and the subsidiaries' use of the
defendant's logo on their documentation indicated a sufficiently
dominating interest in the subsidiaries such that the statements of the
subsidiary's employee could be attributed to the defendant." 3
Finally, the court said that it was irrelevant that the declarant made
the statements two weeks after the defendant had rejected the plaintiffs
franchise application.5°4  The majority rejected the "theory that a
statement evidencing the occurrence of concerted action would be
inadmissible because it followed that activity. ' ' In addition, the court
found no evidence supporting the conclusion that the dealers' statements
to the declarant followed the rejection of plaintiffs application. Thus,
the fact that a vicarious admission was disclosed after the fact did not
defeat its admissibility.
50 6
Moreover, the court noted that the dealers' statements were
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as co-conspirator statements. Since
the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to show concerted action in
violation of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff also demonstrated the requisite
conspiracy for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). °7 This testimony
was admissible as a co-conspirator statement although the declarants in
their deposition testimony, denied making the statements attributed to
them.508
In dissent, Judge Roth found that the declarant did not qualify as the
defendant's agent who was acting within the scope of his agency and
employment. Judge Roth believed that the declarant had no contact in
501. Id.
502. Id. at 1373. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., 505 F. Supp.
1190, 1247-48 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
503. Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1373.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. See Mahlandt v. Wild Candid Survival & Research Ctr., Inc., 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir.
1978).
507. Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1373. See United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, Stillman v. United States, 464 U.S. 936 (1983) (comprehensively identifying the
requirements for admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(E): (1) independent evidence establishes the
existence of a conspiracy and connects the declarant and defendant to it; (2) the statement was made
in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made during the course of the
conspiracy).
508. Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1374.
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the course of his employment with the defendant and, furthermore, had
nothing to do with the defendant's decisions on dealer appointments.50 9
Judge Roth also declined to believe that the defendant "so dominated" the
activities of the credit division that the declarant. could act as the
defendant's agent.51° Moreover, Judge Roth noted that even if the
declarant was the defendant's agent, the admissibility of the statements
was doubtful due to "multiple layers of hearsay" in the declarant's
statements.51' Judge Roth expressed her concern over the admission of
declarations made by unidentified dealers to a dealer, who related the
information to the declarant, who then related it to the plaintiff's
manager, especially since both the alleged declarant and the one identified
dealer denied making the statements attributed to them.512 In addition,
Judge Roth would not have admitted the statements as co-conspirator
statements since she found no evidence of a conspiracy involving both the
defendant and its Philadelphia area dealers.513
B. Rule 801(d)(2)(E): Co-conspirators'Statements
5 14
Issuance of Injunction Does Not Terminate a Conspiracy:
United States v. Local 560'5
In this case, the government sought to expand and make permanent
a 1984 injunction enjoining Michael Sciarra, who allegedly had ties to the
Genovese crime family, from any involvement in the union.5"6
Establishing that Sciarra had continued his involvement in the union after
the 1984 injunction, the government proffered tapes of pre-injunction
conversations between Genovese crime members in which they discussed
their ability to control the union through Sciarra. 5 7  The government
offered these statements as Rule 801(d)(2)(E) co-conspirator




513. Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1387.
514. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) provides, in pertinent part:
A statement is not hearsay if-
(2) ADMISSION BY PARTY-OPPONENT. The statement is offered against a party
and is . . .(E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
515. 974 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1992).
516. Id. at 321. Sciarra was a former Local 560 president. Id. In 1984, the government
obtained a temporary injunction against Sciarra, preventing his involvement in Local 560. Id.
517. Id. at 325.
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statements."' The defendant objected, claiming that the conspiracy
ended with the 1984 injunction and that the statements were, therefore,
not admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.519
The district court admitted the tapes over the defendants objection, and
the defendants were subsequently convicted.520
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. The court found ample
evidence to support the requirements of 801 (d)(2)(E): (1) that Sciarra was
a member of the conspiracy, even after 1984 and (2) that the statements
were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.52" ' In making
this finding, the court said there was ample evidence of Sciarra's
continuing influence over the union's affairs and his involvement with the
Genovese family.5 22  The court said that although the injunction was
prima facie evidence of Sciarra's withdrawal from the conspiracy, the
government's evidence more than sufficiently rebutted that evidence.523
C. Rule 803(2): Excited Utterance
2"
Exclusion of Excited Utterance Evidence: Sakaria v. Trans
World Airlines
5 25
In Sakaria, the plaintiffs, the family of a deceased man, brought a
wrongful death action when the deceased died of a heart attack after
being at an airport during a terrorist attack. The plaintiffs appealed the
district court's exclusion of allegedly excited statements made by the
decedent to the plaintiffs witness, 526 that he had "seen many bodies and
blood. 5 27  The appeal was based on the "excited utterance" exception
to the hearsay rule. 528  The defendant contended that the excited
518. Local 560, 974 F.2d at 325.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 337-38.
521. Id. at 338-39.
522. Id. at 338.
523. Local 560, 974 F.2d at 339.
524. FED. R. EVID. 803 provides in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(2) EXCITED UTTERANCE. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition.
525. 8 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1835 (1994).
526. Id. at 168.
527. Id. at 167 n.1.
528. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
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statements were inadmissible hearsay, as was a medical expert's opinion
which was based on those statements of the witness.529
The Fourth Circuit, Judge Phillips writing for the majority, affirmed
the district court, finding that the statements were inadmissible. ° The
court explained that the statements were hearsay and that they were not
admissible under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, specifically
Rule 803(2), the "excited utterance" exception.53' Rule 803(2) applies
to statements made "relating to a startling event or condition while
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event. "532
The court emphasized that the spontaneity in the statement supplies the
"internal trustworthiness" which is at the heart of the exception.533
Here, the court found the premise of trustworthiness underlying the
exception absent because the decedent was subject to hallucinatory
misperceptions of reality.534 Furthermore, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs did not establish that the decedent was in a position to see the
effect of the attack.535 The court reasoned that this possibility of
hallucination, instead of spontaneity, stripped the evidence of its
trustworthiness.
5 36
529. Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 167-68.
530. Id. at 171.
531. Id.
532. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
533. Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 171-72. See generally, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 272 (4th ed.
1992).
534. Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 172.
535. Id. at 172.
536. Id.
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D. Rule 803(6). Records of Regularly Conducted Activity"37
1. Wire Transfer Documents Not Admissible as Business Records
without. Sufficient Foundation. United States v. Pelullo538
In this RICO prosecution, the government presented various wire
transfer documents from different banks showing the dates, amounts,
sources, and distinctive account numbers of each monetary transfer
attributed to the defendant.539 The government's investigator offered
the documents into evidence, but failed to call the record's custodians
from any of the involved banks. 4 ° The defendant objected that these
documents were hearsay, being offered to prove the truth of the substance
of statements in them.54" ' However, the government argued that the
documents were "adoptive admissions," and alternatively, that they were
admissible under the business records exception to hearsay rule. 42
The Third Circuit, Judge Greenberg writing for the majority,
reversed the defendant's conviction, finding no foundation to support the
admission of the wire transfer documents under Rule 803(6).143  The
government still contended that these documents were business records
of the defendant, as companies controlled by the defendant were the
sources of the statements. 5" The court rejected this argument, saying
that Rule 803(6) requires the custodian of the records, or some other
qualified witness, to lay the foundation for the recordsby testifying: (1)
537. FED. R. EVID. 803. The Rule provides, in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(6) RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED ACTIVITY. A memorandum, report,
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information -transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The
term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.
538. 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1992).
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 200.
542. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 803(6).




with personal knowledge; (2) that the statements had been recorded
contemporaneously; (3) that the records were made in the regular course
of business; and (4) that the records were of a type regularly kept.545
The government also argued that sufficient external guarantees of the
records' trustworthiness existed to admit the documents without calling
the custodian; they were obtained through a grand jury subpoena and
were corroborated by the testimony of witnesses involved in the
transaction.5 46  Despite that, the Third Circuit held that this evidence
was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 803(6)."' 7  Even
though the court noted that the Rule's foundation requirement should be
interpreted broadly and that a custodian of records is not always
necessary (documents may be self-authenticating), the court concluded
that it is not sufficient to satisfy the business record exception unless
there is some independent indication of trustworthiness.548 Otherwise,
the statements are still hearsay.
5 49
2. Affidavit Prepared for Trial is Inadmissible under the Business
Records Exception: Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co.
550
In an ERISA action, the Fourth Circuit, Judge Chapman writing for
the majority, found that an affidavit containing statements of a clinical
director, who was not a doctor, were inadmissible hearsay.5"' The
statements of the director included opinions of doctors and was prepared
for trial. Regardless, the court held that the evidence was not admissible
under Rule 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule,
545. Id. (citing United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1062 (1990) and FED. R. EVID. 803(6)).
546. Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 201 (citing Furst, 886 F.2d at 572 and United States v. Hathaway,
798 F.2d 902, 905-07 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that in mail and wire fraud prosecution arising out
of fraudulent investment schemes, transaction statements, trade tickets, advertising materials,
cancelled checks, client files, correspondence and client account agreements were only admissible
because these documents were not offered for truth of matters asserted #ierein, but were offered to
prove the defendant's possession of the documents).
547. Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 201.
548. Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 201. See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 803(6)[02], at 803-178 (1991); In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig.,
723 F.2d 238, 288 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, inpart, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 471 U.S. 10002 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, sub. nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
505 F. Supp. 190, 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
549. Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 201.
550. 990 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1993).
551. Id. at 159. The court found that Phoenix Home Life abused its discretion by not
considering any specific reasons for denying the Weaver's claim. Id.
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because the affidavit was simply not a record of regularly conducted
activity. 52
E. Rule 803(8): Public Records and Reports Exception
55
1
1. Evidence of a Police Radio Call and the
Contents of a 911 Call Contained in a Police
Computer Record Are Hearsay: United States v.
Sallins
554
A district court jury convicted the defendant of one count of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 55 On appeal, the
defendant contended that the district court had erred in admitting the
hearsay evidence of a "police radio dispatch and a police computer record
detailing the contents of a 911 call."5 6  On the other hand, the
government argued that the radio dispatch was not hearsay, since "it was
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted -- that there was in
fact a black male dressed in all black with a gun on the 2500 block of
North Franklin Street." ' Rather, the government contended that the
evidence was introduced only as "background to explain why the officers
went to North Franklin Street." '55
552. Id. See 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 548, § 803(6). The evidence would be admissible to
the extent that the clinic director is explaining procedures and organization of Cost Care. However,
such information is irrelevant to whether the Weavers were provided the specific medical reasons for
the denial of benefits or to whether any specific reason for the denial of benefits did exist. Weaver,
990 F.2d at 159 n.4.
553. FED. R. EVID. 803. The Rule provides, in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(8) PUBLIC RECORDS AND REPORTS. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the
activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding,
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the
Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
554. 993 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1993).
555. Id. at 345.
556. Id. at 345.




The Third Circuit, Judge Greenberg writing for the majority,
reversed and remanded the district court decision, because the radio
dispatch and the computer records were inadmissible hearsay. 59 The
Third Circuit noted that although several courts have admitted testimony
by police officers that establishes background for their actions, the use of
out-of-court statements to show background has been an area of
"widespread abuse."56 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the facts
of this case undermined the government's position. The court believed
that the government could have elicited testimony that the officers were
responding to a radio call without revealing the calls' contents. 6'
Secondly, the court noted that no background beyond the officers'
observations was necessary to help the jury understand why the officers
pursued and arrested the defendant. 62  Accordingly, the court
concluded that the testimony regarding the radio call not only was
inadmissible to show background, but also that it was not offered for that
purpose.63  The court said that "[t]he absence of a tenable non-hearsay
purpose for offering the contents of the police radio call establishes that
the evidence could have been offered only for its truth value."5"
The government also argued that the computer report was admissible
under Rule 803(8), the public records exception. The defendant agreed
that the record fit within the definition of a public record under the Rule,
but argued that the portion of the record detailing the 911 call should
have been excluded as "double hearsay. 565 The Third Circuit agreed,
noting that the admission of a third parties' out-of-court statements
566requires a separate exception. The court held that the government
had failed to establish that the contents of the 911 record were offered for
a valid non-hearsay purpose. 67 Thus, the court found no merit in the
559. Sallins, 993 F.2d at 345.
560. Id. at 346 (quoting 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249, at 104 (4th ed. 1992)).
561. Id.
562. Id. at 346-47.
563. Id
564. Sallins, 993 F.2d at 347. See United States v. Bettelyoun, 892 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1989)
(finding no valid reason for admission of testimony relating to contents of police radio call other that
the truth).
565. Sallins, 993 F.2d at 347.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 347. See United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1110 (1986) sub. nom. Pecic v. United States, and cert. denied, sub nom. Katz v. United States,
476 U.S. 1159. In De Peri, the defendant wanted to introduce evidence reports prepared by an FBI
agent detailing his interviews with certain third parties. The court held that while Rule 803(8)(B)
would permit the defendant to introduce the reports themselves, which ordinarily would be considered
hearsay, a separate exception was required for the third parties' out-of-court statements. De Peri,
778 F.2d at 977.
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argument that the details of the 911 call were admissible as background
information.56
2. Investigatory Accident Reports of Local Police and Coast
Guard and Weather Forecasts for Area of Accident and Intended
Destination Are Admissible: In re Munyan
569
In this case, the petitioner filed a petition in admiralty for
exoneration from, or limitation of, liability for any claims arising out of
a boating accident."' He contended that "as a result of severe,
unexpected weather, . . . the boating accident and its resulting damage
were not due to any fault on his own part, but, rather, [was] due to an
"act of God," and, therefore, he should be exonerated from any liability
on claims arising from the accident."57'
The petitioner filed a motion in limine, seeking to admit several
investigative reports concerning the accident, as well as weather reports
prepared by public officials.572 The petitioner sought to have the
reports admitted under Rule 803(8)(C), the public records exception.573
However, the claimant objected to their admission, because the reports
were not sufficiently trustworthy.574
The district court admitted the Coast Guard and Police Reports. The
court stated that "Rule 803(8)(C) is based on the assumption that public
officials perform their duties properly, without motive or interest other
than to prepare accurate reports." '575 In addition, the court noted that
to exclude evidence that falls within Rule 803(8)(C), there must be "an
affirmative showing of untrustworthiness, beyond the obvious fact that
the declarant is not in court to testify.
576
The claimant also asserted that the reports had not been grounded on
any factual investigation to support the alleged conclusion. The district
court reiterated the Supreme Court's list of four factors which are to be
considered in determining trustworthiness: (1) the timeliness of the
568. Sallins, 933 F.2d at 348.
569. 143 F.R.D. 560 (D.N.J. 1992).
570. Id.
571. Id. at 562.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Munyan, 143 F.R.D. at 562.
575. Id. at 563. See Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 805
F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1986); Ellis v. International Playtex Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 1984).
576. Munyan, 143 F.R.D. at 563. See Bradford Trust, 805 F.2d at 54 (quoting Kehm v. Proctor
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983)). See also Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467,
481 (9th Cir. 1988).
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investigation; (2) the investigator's skill or experience; (3) whether a
hearing was held; and (4) possible bias when reports are prepared with
a view toward possible litigation.577 Based on these criteria, the district
court deemed the Police and Coast Guard reports admissible under Rule
803(8)(C)."'8 In sum, the court determined that the claimant had failed
to produce any evidence that the police and Coast Guard reports were
unreliable or untrustworthy under the above-mentioned criteria.
5 79
Secondly, the petitioner contended that the Bay Coastal Marine
Forecast prepared by the National Weather Service was a factual finding
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to Rule 803(8)(C). The
claimant asserted that the forecast that the petitioner requested to be
admitted, alone, would be inadmissible, since it did not portray a
complete picture of the weather that the petitioner actually had
observed. 8  The claimant further contended that the forecast should
have included an area north of that which petitioner had requested,
because the storm traveled from this area.5"' The court admitted both
of the forecasts under Rule 803(8)(C) after finding that they were both
trustworthy reports of the weather conditions.
58 2
3. Government Reports which Include Findings and Opinions from
an Official Investigation: Distaff, Inc. v. Springfield Contracting
Corp.
583
Judge Hamilton, writing the opinion for the majority of the Fourth
Circuit, found that a government report containing findings and opinions
from a fire investigation was admissible under Rule 803(8), even though
the Navy would not allow the author to testify.5 4 The court stated that
the report was admissible under the hearsay exception if its contents were
trustworthy5 85 and that, although admission of such reports without the
577. Munyan, 143 F.R.D. at-564. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169, 170
(1988) (noting that under Rule 803(8)(C), "the requirement that reports contain factual findings bars
the admission of statements not based on factual investigations." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
broadly construed "factual findings." It held that "as long as the conclusion is based on a factual
investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, it should be admissible along with
other portions of the report.").
578. Munyan, 143 F.R.D. at 564.
579. Id. at 564-65.
580. Id. at 567.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. 984 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1993).
584. Id. at 110.
585. Id. at 111. See, e.g., Beach Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) (holding a
Navy aircraft accident investigative report was admissible).
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opportunity to cross-examine may be controversial, the general rule
allows their admission.586
Similar to the Third Circuit," 7 the Forth Circuit recited that the
factors to consider in determining the admissibility of the evidence
included: (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special skill or
experience of the investigator; (3) possible motivational problems; and (4)
other factors that support trustworthiness or lack thereof.88 Thereafter,
the court admitted the report even though the defendant did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.8 9 The court reasoned that
the purpose of the hearsay exception was to permit trustworthy evidence,
even when other circumstances, such as the Navy regulation, disallowed
cross-examination.59 ' Thus, the Court remanded and noted that the trial
court may still find the evidence inadmissible when analyzing the factors
for trustworthiness or the factors under Rule 403."9,
4. Admissibility of Judicial Findings of Fact: Nipper v.
Snipes
592
In Snipes, the Fourth Circuit, Judge Widener writing for the
majority, held that the admission of judicial findings of fact was
reversible error, because they were not "public records" within the
meaning of the public records exception to the hearsay rule.593
Originally, the findings were entered in a state court in a different case
involving the same parties.5 94 Here, the plaintiffs in the case argued
that the evidence was admissible under the public records exception and
that defendants did not show that the record lacked sufficient
trustworthiness or authenticity.5 95
However, the court of appeals disagreed and explained that although
the exception allows admission of "factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to the authority granted by law," the judge
586. Distaff, 984 F.2d at 111. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 548, 803(8)[03].
587. United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1993).
588. Distaff, 984 F.2d at 11. See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 300-01
(4th Cir. 1984) (citing Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1983)).
See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 548, 803(8).
589. Distaff, 984 F.2d at 112.
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. 7 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 1993).
593. Id. at 418.
594. Id. at 416.
595. Id. at 417.
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in a civil case is not an investigator." The court added that the
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(8) indicates that the Rule was
intended for agents of the executive branch and that the provision in the
rules was drafted to allow for the admission of that evidence.597
Therefore, the court interpreted the exception to not include judicial
findings of fact.59"
F. Rule 804(b)(1): Former Testimony599
Admission of Deposition Testimony of an Unavailable Witness:
Horne v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.
600
In a products liability action, the plaintiff contended that the district
court had erred in admitting depositions under the Rule 804(b)(1) hearsay
exception. The plaintiff claimed that the admission of the depositions
was reversible error, because the court did not determine that the witness
was unavailable and that the participants in the deposition did not share
similar motives to develop the testimony.60 1
The Fourth Circuit, Chief Judge Ervin writing for the majority,
affirmed the lower court, finding that the court's admission of depositions
under the exception without contrary evidence implicitly draws a finding
of unavailability of the witness. 6 2  The Fourth Circuit also explained
that in determining the admissibility of the evidence, the court must focus
on "the similarity of motives between the predecessor in interest and the
one against whom the deposition is now offered."6 3 The court asserted
596. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C)).
597. Nipper, 7 F.3d at 417. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note; 56 F.R.D.
183, 311-313. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1185
(E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[A] review of the advisory committee note make it clear.that judicial findings are
not encompassed; not only is there not the remotest reference to judicial findings, but there is specific
focus on the findings of officials and agencies with the executive branch.").
598. Nipper, 7 F.3d at 417.
599. FED. R. EVID. 804. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
(b) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONs. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) FORMER TESTIMONY. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law
in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination.
600. 4 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 1993).
601. Id. 282-83.
602. Id. at 283.
603. Id. at 282. See Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp. 782 F.2d 1156, 1160-61 (4th Cir.
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that when these motives differ, the evidence is not permitted." 4 The
court then determined that without the plaintiff demonstrating distinctions
between her case and the prior litigation, there was no abuse in the trial
court's finding that they were similar."'
G. Rule 804(b)(5): Other Exceptions
606
The Scope of the Residual Exception and the Admissibility of
Prior Testimony: United States v. Clarke.7
The Fourth Circuit, Judge Wilkinson writing for the majority, found
that the district court did not err in admitting the testimony of the
defendant's brother, which was given at a prior hearing, that he had
directed defendant to purchase a toolbox and arrange for delivery of
cocaine in it.608  Although the brother would not' testify at the
defendant's trial, the trial court admitted the evidence under Rule
804(b)(5).6"9 The trial court determined that the statement had "a high
degree of trustworthiness," because the brother had no motive to lie.610
Also, the lower court believed that the evidence was more probative on
the point offered than any other evidence.
6'I
1986) (In Lohrmann, the court did not allow the introduction of a deposition from an earlier litigation
relating to. the hazardous effects upon the health of plant workers exposed to raw asbestos. The
plaintiff was not a, worker, but..apipefitter. The court found that the deposition did not present
similar opportunity and motive to develop testimony and thus, was not admitted.).
604. Home, 4 F.3dat 282.
605. Id. at 283.
606. FED. R. EVID.804. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
(b) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) OTHER EXCEPTIONS. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is-offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
* through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of.these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
607. 2 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1194 (1994).
608. Id.,





In affirming, the Fourth Circuit explained that even though the
statements would be inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(1) because the
defendant had no opportunity to examine the witness, the evidence was
admissible pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5), -the residual hearsay exception."2
The court emphasized that this exception allows the admission of
statements not covered by any other exception, but that carry the
equivalent trustworthiness.61 a The court did believe that a "near miss"
of another exception automatically rendered a reliable statement
inadmissible and thus, held that even though a statement did not clearly
fall under one of the specific exceptions, it still may be admissible.6" 4
X. Miscellaneous Rules
A. Rule 901 (b)(3): Requirement of Authentication or Identification615
Handwritten Notes of Drug Sales is Admissible: United States
v. McGlory6t 6
In a prosecution for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to
distribute, the Third Circuit, Justice Hutchinson writing for the majority,
ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
handwritten notes detailing drug sales, since the notes were properly
authenticated and were not hearsay." 7 Although the government's
handwriting expert had insufficient handwriting exemplars to determine
the author of some of the notes, the court explained that they were
nonetheless properly authenticated for purposes of Rule 901. 6" The
court noted that the Rule requires only a prima facie showing of
authenticity to the court; it does not'require a full argument on
51.
612. Clarke, 2 F.3d at 83.
613. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5)).
614. Id. (Appellant argued that the Rule should be read narrowly, meaning that "not
specifically covered" would mean in no way touched by one of the prior four exceptions.).
615. FED. R. EVID. 901. REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION OR IDENTIFICATION
(b) ILLUSTRATIONS. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule:
(3) COMPARISON BY TRIER OR EXPERT WITNESS. Comparison by the trier of
fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.
616. 968 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 415, 627, 1388 (1993).
617. Id. at 331-33. The Police seized the notes from McGlory's home and the trash outside of
his home. Id.
618. Id. at 331.
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admissibility.619 Once a prima facie case is made, the court asserted
that the evidence goes to the jury, and the jury must ultimately determine
the authenticity of the evidence.62
Viewing the record in its entirety, the Third Circuit held that there
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that
McGlory authored the notes in question despite the government's inability
to fully establish McGlory's authorship by expert opinion.62 ' The
evidence showed that the notes were seized from the trash outside of the
defendant's known residences during the course of the conspiracy or
during a search of the residences. 22 Some of the notes from the trash
were tom from a notebook found in one of the defendant's residences,
and other notes were contained in the same garbage bags as other
identifying information. 623 Further, some of the notes were written on
note paper from hotels at which McGlory stayed during the course of the
conspiracy. 64 Although he could not be conclusive, the government's
handwriting expert testified to numerous similarities between the writing
on several notes and a handwriting exemplar which the defendant had
provided. 625  Finally, the notes were similar in form and contained
similar amounts, as well as the initials of persons listed in the defendant's
personal phone books. 26 The initials and names that appeared on the
notes also linked the notes to the defendant.627 Considering all of the
evidence, the court concluded that the notes could have been
authenticated by their contents and, thus, precise handwriting
identification was not required.628
The Third Circuit additionally held that the notes were not hearsay,
since they were offered as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's
association with the persons whose names appeared on the notes.629
The court also determined that the notes were admissible under the co-
conspirators exception.630
619. Id. at 328-29.
620. McGlory, 968 F.2d at 328-29. See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 788 F.2d
918, 928 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976)).





626. McGlory, 968 F.3d at 330.
627. Id.
628. Id. at 331.
629. Id. at 333.
630. Id. at 338.
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B- Rule 1004(): Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents63
Admission of Reconstruction of Earlier Works is Admissible:
Takeall v. Pepsico, Inc.632
In a copyright infringement case, the district court allowed a
reconstruction of the plaintiff's earlier works to show his authorship of
the "You got the right one, Baby, uh-huh!" phrase that Defendant Pepsico
had used in its advertising.633 The plaintiff contended that the originals
were lost in an airline baggage mix-up.634 At trial, the defendant
claimed that the reconstruction was not admissible under the "best
evidence rule;"6" however, the court disagreed, stating that the




This survey has examined the most recent federal district and
appellate decisions, particulary in the Third and Fourth Circuit. It has
discussed some constitutional issues that have an evidentiary nexus and
has attempted to explain some of the most complicated evidentiary
problems encountered by the federal judges. The author hopes that a
review of this article will clarify the state of the law in this area for all
readers.
631. FED. R. EVID. 1004. ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER EVIDENCE OF CONTENTS
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or
photograph is admissible if-
(1) ORIGINALS LOST OR DESTROYED. All originals are lost or have been
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith....
632. 809 F.Supp. 19 (D. Md. 1992), affd, 14 F.3d 596 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2742 (1994).
633. Id. at 20.
634. Id.
635. Id. at 20-21.
636. Id. at 21.
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